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Abstract
Employment protection legislation in Croatia is among  in relatively high wages.  So, wages in Croatia are higher
the most strict in Europe.  Firing is difficult and costly,  than among  its competitors,  even  after adjusting for
and flexible forms of employment  are limited.  Is this  productivity. These high labor costs  are likely to
apparent  rigidity reflected-as one would expect based  contribute to  limited job  creation  in existing firms, but
on standard economic theory-in low labor market  also are  likely to discourage  the entry of-and thus job
dynamics?  Is job creation low and hiring limited?  Is the  creation in-new firms. The author presents  evidence
job security of insiders achieved at the cost of outsiders  that firm growth has been indeed limited in Croatia,
not being able to enter the labor market?  Rutkowski  contributing to the low employment level.
attempts to answer these questions  by examining job  Rutkowski examines  other potential  causes of high
flows. If the employment protection  legislation  is  unemployment in Croatia (the unemployment  benefit
binding,  then job and worker turnover should be low.  system,  labor taxation,  the wage  structure, and skill and
He shows that this is indeed the case. Hiring is limited  spatial mismatches).  He argues that they do not play a
and the average job tenure  is very long  in Croatia. Job  substantial  part in accounting  for poor  labor market
destruction is low, however job creation  is still  lower.  outcomes  in Croatia.  The author concludes  that the
The result  is accumulation  of unemployment,  in large  stringent employment protection  legislation  is the key
part due to new labor market entrants not being able to  labor market institution behind low job creation  and
find a job.  high unemployment.  Based on this he recommends
The high degree  of job protection  also  seems to  specific  measures aimed at liberalizing  the labor market
strengthen the bargaining  position of insiders and results  to foster job  creation  and employment.
This paper-a product of the Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort
in the reg'ton to examine labor market performance and its contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction. Copies
of the'paper are  available  free  from the World Bank,  1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact Jan
Rutkowski, room H7-170, telephone 202-458-4569,  fax 202-477-3387, email address jrutkowski@worldbank.org.  Policy
Research Working Papers  are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  August 2003.  (63  pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished.  The
papers  carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Employment  protection  legislation  in  Croatia  is  among  the  most  strict  in
Europe.  Termination  is  difficult and  costly,  and  flexible  forms  of employment  are
limited.  At  the  same  time  long-term  unemployment  is  high while  employment  is
declining.  This  paper  tries  to  determine  if these  two  facts  are  linked.  Does  the
stringent  protection  legislation  contribute  to  high  unemployment?  To  answer  this
question  the paper analyzes  labor market dynamics  in Croatia,  particularly  job flows.
If employment  protection regulation  is binding,  then job  turnover is expected  to be
low.  Job  destruction  will be low because  it is costly  for the  employer to close  an
unproductive job.  Job creation  will be low because employers  will avoid hiring new
workers  in  order  not to  incur  future  dismissal  costs.  The  paper  finds  that  this  is
indeed the case.  Job destruction  in Croatia  is low by international  standards,  and job
creation  is  still  lower.  The  result  is  falling  employment  and  accumulation  of
unemployment,  in large part due to new labor market entrants not being able to find a
job.
The paper  examines other potential  causes of high unemployment  in Croatia
(the unemployment benefit  system, labor taxation,  the wage  structure,  and  skill and
spatial mismatches).  It argues  that they do not play a substantial  part in accounting
for  poor  labor  market  outcomes  in  Croatia.  Thus,  the  paper  concludes  that  the
stringent employment protection legislation  is the key labor market institution causing
high  unemployment.  Low  job  creation  seems  the  price  to  be  paid  for  high  job
protection.
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section presents key labor market
outcomes  in Croatia.  The second  section analyses  labor market dynamics,  focusing
on job flows.- The third  section  examines potential  factors  that explain  the stagnant,
low turnover nature  of the Croatian  labor  market.  The  final  section concludes  and
recommends reforms to foster job creation.
I.  LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE  IN CROATIA
The labor  market  does not perform  well  in Croatia.  The  unemployment rate
hovers  around  16  percent  (Table  1).  The  gradual  increase  in  the  (registered)unemployment  stock  has  started  in  1996,  when  inflow  into  has  begun  to  exceed
outflow from unemployment,  and has accelerated  after 1998  (Figure  1).1  Majority of
the  unemployed  (55  percent)  are  jobless  for  over  one  year,  i.e.  are  long-term
unemployed.  High unemployment combined with a low labor force participation rate
(about  50 percent)  implies  low employment-to-population  ratio.  Only  42 percent  of
persons of working age (aged 15 or more) are employed in Croatia.  This entails a low
level  of the  utilization  of labor resources  and translates  in the  lower level  of output
and, eventually, lower economic welfare.
Table 1  Key labor force indicators
2000.1  2000.11  2001.1  2001.11
Labor force participation rate  50.4  51.1  49.0  50.3
Employment rate  42.8  42.4  41.5  42.1
Unemployment  rate  15.1  17.0  15.3.  16.3
Share of LTU  52.1  53.6  56.9  55.3
Notes:
Labor force participation rate = (Employed  + Unemployed)/Population  aged  15+
Employment rate = Employed/Population  aged  15+
Unemployment rate = Unemployment/Labor force
Source: Labour Force in the Republic of Croatia,  Second Half-year of 2001, Central  Bureau of Statistics.
Figure 1  The evolution  of registered unemployment,  1992 - 2002
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Source: Croatian  Employment Service.
Data used to calculate the unemployment rate (shown in Table 1)  come from the Labor Force
Survey (LFS), which applies the standard ILO definition of unemployment.  Data on the dynamics of
unemployment (show in Figure  1)  come from the unemployment register and are not comparable  with
the LFS data.  The description of both sources of unemployment data is provided in Box 1.
-2-The  low  employment-to-population  ratio  - a  key  indicator  of labor  market
performance  - is  a result of three  factors  that  distinguish  Croatia  from an  average
OECD country (Table 2).  These are:
*  Extremely  high youth  unemployment  (over 40  percent)  and low  labor  force
participation of young persons (aged 15-24);
*  Relatively low labor force participation  of prime-age men (aged 25-49);
*  Relatively low labor force participation of older persons (aged  50 or more).
The  overall  low  labor  force  participation  reflects  poor  availability  of job
opportunities  and is associated  with the so-called "discouraged  worker"  effect.  This
means that workers cease their job search effort because  their earlier attempts  to find
work have proved futile  and thus they believe that no jobs are available.  High youth
unemployment  is often indicative  of labor market rigidities and barriers to entry (such
as high hiring and  flring costs).  These  characteristics  of the labor market are  quite
typical  of  other  transition  economies  with  inflexible  labor  markets.
-3-Table 2 Labor force indicators in Croatia and in OECD countries by gender and age categories
All workers  Men  Women
15 to 64  15 to 24  25 to 49  50 to 64  15 to 24  25 to 49  50 to 64  15 to 24  25 to 49  50 to 64
Croatia (2001.11)
Unemployment rate  16.8  41.9  14.2  8.3  41.8  11.5  8.5  42.0  17.2  8.1
Labor force participation  rate  62.2  41.9  82.4  40.9  43.3  88.2  54.0  40.4  77.0  29.2
Employment  rate  51.8  24.3  70.7  37.5  25.2  77.9  49.5  23.8  63.8  27.1
15 to 64  15 to 24  25 to 54  55 to 64  15 to 24  25 to 54  55 to 64  15 to 24  25 to 54  55 to 64
OECD (1999)
Unemployment  rate  6.4  11.8  5.4  5.2  11.7  4.9  5.6  11.9  6.1  4.6
Labor force participation  rate  70.4  53.0  80.3  51.6  57.8  93.0  64.5  48.0  67.8  39.4
Employment  rate  65.9  46.7  75.9  48.9  51.1  88.5  60.8  42.3  63.6  37.6
Source:
Croatia: Labour Force in the Republic of Croatia,  Second half-year of 2001,  Central  Bureau of Statistics;  Author's calculations.
OECD:  Employment  Outlook, 2000.
-4-The low employment-to-population  ratio in Croatia is, inter alia, the result of a
mode  of  labor  market  adjustment  to  numerous  supply  and  demand  "shocks"
associated  with the economic  transition.  As  in most other  countries  of Central  and
Easter  Europe  (CEE),  the brunt of adjustment has  been born by  employment  rather
than  wages.  Employment  has  declined  while  - once  the  growth  of output  has
resumed  --  wages  have  roughly  followed  productivity  increases.  Since  1995
employment  has  declined  by a few percent,  while  real  wages have  grown by  about
one third and productivity (in industry) has increased  even more (Table  3).2
Table 3 Selected  indicators of labor market dynamics,  1995-2001
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
1995 = 100
Real gross wages  107.9  117.2  124.9  132.1  133.0  131.8
Employment  103.7  96.1  99.1  97.4  94.3  96.3
Labor productivity (industry)  111.3  124.5  135.4  140.7  146.7  160.8
Memorandum:
LFS unemployment  rate, %  10.0  9.9  11.4  13.551  16.05  15.8
I indicates the break in  time-series
Note:  In  2000 the sample  frame for the Labor Force  Survey (LFS)  was changed and accordingly,
the results are 'not fully comparable over time.
Source: Central  Bureau of Statistics, the World  Bank database, Author's  calculations.
The  fall  in  employment  coupled  with  significant  productivity  gains  reflects
what can be called a "productivity  catch-up".  Overmanning  was  common in socially
owned  firms in  Croatia,  which was associated  with low labor productivity.  As the
transition  progressed  enterprises  have  been  subject  to  an  intensified  competitive
pressure,  coming  from  the  developing  private  sector  as  well  as  from  foreign
competitors,  increasingly  entering  the  Croatian  market.  This has  forced  firms  to
reduce  costs, cut employment and improve productivity.  For many firms,  especially
the  privatized  ones,  downsizing has become  a prerequisite  for a survival  in  a more
competitive environment.  To illustrate  this process, an  average  firm size  has almost
halved during the transition in Croatia, decreasing  from over 22 employees in 1993 to
about 12 employees in 2000.3
2  Data on employment levels can be inaccurate due to problems with adequate coverage of
small private  firms by the employment survey.
3  Data refer to registered firms which are legal persons (FINA/ZAP  register).
-5-The resulting labor shedding has led to improved productivity and lower costs,
but also - given limited job creation - has contributed to unemployment.  Indeed,  over
50 percent of the unemployed  are persons  who lost their job, of which 20 percent in
the public  sector,  and  30  percent  in the private  sector  (Table  4).  Nonetheless,  it is
worth noting that this proportion of job losers  in total unemployment is significantly
lower than in other intensively  restructuring  transition economies,  (such  as Hungary
or Poland) and OECD countries,  where it varies  around 75 percent.  This means that
new entrants account for  a disproportionately  large fraction of unemployment,  which
again  points  to  labor  market  rigidities,  preventing  persons  without  previous  job
experience  to enter the labor market.
Table 4 Job seekers  by previous labor market status, 2001
Percent of
Labor force status before the start of job search  all job
seekers
Employed  55.9
Workers in the public sector  19.9
Workers in the private sector  25.9
Self-employed and employers (private sector)  3.9
Unpaid family workers  1.4
Temporary workers for payment in kind  4.9




Military service  8.2
Others  1.1
Source: CBS,  LFS second half-year 2001, Author's calculations.
Enterprise  restructuring  has  given  rise  to  accelerated  inflows  into
unemployment,  a  process  which begun in the mid 1990s  in Croatia  (Table  5).  This
has been  reflected  in  an  increasing  proportion of workers who  were  laid-off among
the unemployed  and, correspondingly,  in a decreasing proportion of workers without
previous  labor  market  experience  (whose  share  in  unemployment  was
disproportionately  large at an early stage of the transition in Croatia).
At the  same  time  oufflows  from  unemployment,  including  outflows  to jobs,
have  slowed  down,  and  presently  fall  short  of inflows  into  unemployment.  For
example,  in 2001  as much as  74 thousand  persons newly  registered  at Employment
-6-Offices,  while  70 thousand  were  deregistered,  of which only less  than 40 thousand
reportedly found jobs (Table 5).  Since the excess of inflows into unemployment over
outflows  from  unemployment  has  persisted  over a  number of years,  the  result has
been a gradual  build up of unemployment.  While registered unemployment  was 240
thousand in 1995,  in early 2002 it already exceeded 410 thousand.
There  is  a  discrepancy  between  unemployment  data  coming  from  the
unemployment register and from the Labor Force Survey  (see Box 1 for a description
of the differences between both sources).  This is a common regularity, and Croatia is
no  exception,  however  the  discrepancy  is  quite  dramatic.  Over  40  percent of all
persons  who are registered  at Employment  Offices  are not unemployed according  to
the ILO definition of unemployment!4 They either have a job (in the informal sector),
or are not actively looking for work, or are not available for work.
The genuinely  unemployed as a rule register  at Employment  Offices; only  14
percent of the job seekers  do not register,  and  this group  is likely to include mainly
persons whose unemployment  is short-term or transient.  The net effect is thus that the
unemployment register data significantly - by almost 50 percent - overestimate the
level of unemployment.
4  Based on the Labor Force Survey data from the second half of 2001.
-7-Box l
Unemployment:  the Labor Force Survey vs. administrative data
In Croatia as in most other countries, there are two main sources of data on
unemployment:  the Labor Force Survey (which  is carried out twice a year by the Croatian
Bureau of Statistics)  and the unemployment  register, maintained by the Croatian Employment
Service (CES).
Both data sets have its strengths and weaknesses.  The administrative data collected
by the CES it provide  long time-series of monthly information on persons who registered as
unemployed  (their socio-demographic characteristics,  reasons for unemployment, duration of
job search, etc.).  Thanks to the fact that administrative  data are compiled and published
monthly, they allow one to follow changes in unemployment on a regular basis.  As such they
provide an early signal on changes in labor market conditions.  However, the data are affected
by various incentives to register,  such as eligibility to unemployment benefits, pension and
health insurance, and social assistance benefits.  As a result, some persons register in order to
get access to these benefits, although they are not genuinely unemployed.  They either have
an informal sector job, are not looking for a job, or are not available for work. At the same
time, persons who are genuinely unemployed, often do not register if  they are not eligible for
benefits associated  with registration.  The net effect is usually (although not necessarily
always) that the unemployment register data overstate the actual magnitude of
unemployment.  In the case of Croatia this upward bias is quite substantial  (see text).
Moreover, changes in benefit regime and thus in incentives to register imply that
administrative data on unemployment are often not fully comparable over time.  For example,
the tightening of unemployment benefit eligibility conditions leads to the drop in registered
unemployment,  as does more aggressive  application ofjob search/availability  tests, despite
the fact the underlying labor market conditions have not changed:
In contrast, unemployment data coming from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) provide
information on the labor force  status which is not affected by administrative regulations and
thus more correctly reflect actual labor market conditions.  The LFS uses the standard
Intemational Labor Office (ILO) definition of unemployment, whereby a persons is
unemployed if  he/she jointly meets three conditions:  (a) does not have a job, (b) is actively
looking for a job, and (c) is available for work.  Thanks to this the LFS produces
intemationally  comparable data on unemployment.  In principle, the LFS also produces
unemployment data that is consistent over time, although changes in the sample frame, survey
design, etc. may lead to a limited comparability of results  over time.  For example, the CBS
changed the sample frame for the LFS in 2000,  which affected comparability of data.  The
disadvantage of the LFS is that the survey is carried out with a relatively low frequency and
sometimes irregularly.  In addition, processing of the results is time consuming, meaning that
the results are disseminated with a substantial delay (about 3 months in Croatia).  This makes
the LFS less suitable for regular and "real time" monitoring of labor market conditions.
However, given the large number of variables it provides, the LFS is an invaluable  source of
information for the purposes of labor market research.
In this paper we relay mainly on the LFS and accordingly use the ILO unemployment
rate and other labor force indicators.  However, to illustrate the trend in unemployment, we
use the administrative  data on registered unemployment,  as in this case a much longer time-
series is available (the first wave of the LFS was conducted in Croatia only in November
1996).
-8-Relatively  few  unemployed  receive  unemployment  benefit.  The  benefit
coverage  rate  (percentage  of unemployed  who  receive  benefit)  has  been below  20
percent  since  the  mid  1990s,  reflecting  two  factors:  (a) a  large proportion  of new
entrants  to  the  labor  market,  who  do  not  have  an  insurance  record  to  qualify  for
unemployment benefit,  and (b) a large proportion of long term unemployed,  who are
no  longer  eligible  for  the  benefit  (with  some  exceptions,  unemployment  benefit
duration  is  capped  at one year).  The  benefit replacement  rate  (i.e.  benefit/eamings
ratio)  is  low,  as  unemployment  benefit  accounts  for  only  about  one-fourth  of the
average  wage.  (See  Box 2  on the  details  of the  unemployment  benefits  system in
Croatia
-9-Table 5 Registered unemployment,  1992-2002
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002.3
Unemployment ('000)  266.6  250.8  243.3  240.6  261  277.7  287.8  321.9  357.9  380.2  414.4
Percentage of unemployment stock
Women  53.0  55.2  53.6  51.6  49.7  49.4  51.9  52.5  52.7  53.5  53.8
No labor market experience  29.8  32.0  34.2  35.1  33.6  32.2  31.4  29.4  28.2  27.4
Recipients of UB  22.1  10.1  12.5  15.0  20.3  19.9  15.6  16.9  17.7  18.5
Inflow (newly registered)  66.9  64.1  77.2  73.6  77.9  78.9  76.9  77.4  73.2  73.9  5.2
Outflow  75.3  71.3  76.6  73.0  70.2  72.5  71.5  65.2  62.9  69.5  5.0
to jobs  30.0  29.1  35.2  31.5  35.7  36.7  38.0  32.8  33.0  38.8  3.2
removed from  register  45.3  42.1  41.4  41.4  34.5  35.8  33.6  32.4  29.9  30.8  1.8
Unemployment-to-Vacancies  ratio  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.9  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.4  2.4  1.9
Source: Monthly Statistics Bulletin 3/2002,  Croatian  Employment Service, Author's calculations.
-10-All these  factors  - the low  replacement  rate,  relatively  short  duration  of the
benefit, and limited coverage - imply that labor supply disincentives  are modest  and
thus the unemployment benefit system  is unlikely to have much influence  on the level
of unemployment  in Croatia.  Most importantly, low benefit coverage implies that the
role of existing  labor  supply  disincentives  is  limited as  few people  are  affected  by
them.
Box 2
Unemployment  Benefit System  in Croatia
Eligibility condition:  work record of at least 9 months in the last 24 month.
Benefit  replacement rate: 100 percent of average  salary (net of social security
contributions)  in the last three month preceding unemployment,  subject to the
minimum of 20 percent of the national average salary,  and the maximum determined
by the Minister of Labor and approved by the Minister of Finance.  Currently the
maximum amount of unemployment  benefit is Kn 900  (compared to average wage of
around Kn 3600).  This means that in practice unemployment benefit in Croatia is a
flat rate  benefit, as the fixed amount of the benefit is much below the national average
wage.
Benefit duration:  The duration of unemployment benefit payment is related to the
length of service, with the minimum of 78 days and the maximum of 312 days.
However,  workers with long years of service (35 for men and 30 for women) are
entitled to an open-ended unemployment  benefit, i.e. until they find a new job or
acquire retirement rights.
The specific schedule is as follows:
Duration of unemployment  Length of service
benefit (days)  (years)









312  more than  10  years
unlimited  Men: more than 35 years
Women: more than 30 years
Source:  Law on Employment Mediation and Entitlements during Unemployment,
2002.Surprisingly,  the  unemployment-to-vacancies  (UN)  ratio  has  somewhat
improved  over the recent period,  and is quite favorable at  1.9 (meaning that there are
less than two unemployed per one vacancy).  The relatively large number of vacancies
suggests  a  structural  component  of unemployment  in Croatia.  For example,  unfilled
job  vacancies  are  likely  to  indicate  that  the  unemployed  have  different  skills  than
those required  in vacant jobs.  However, better data and further research are necessary
to find out to what extent unemployment in Croatia has structural character.
To  conclude,  labor  market  outcomes  in  Croatia  have  been  and  still  are
unsatisfactory.  Employment  has  declined  and  unemployment  has  increased  during
the transition.  This has led to the fall in labor force participation and, consequently, to
the  low employment-to-population  ratio.  Relatively  few persons  of working  age in
Croatia have jobs.  This low utilization  of labor resources implies high social cost and
a  loss in social welfare.  An increase  in labor force  utilization is critical  for Croatia's
economic  growth and increase in the standards of living.
Seemingly, the reason behind declining employment and rising unemployment
is enterprise  restructuring  associated  with  labor  shedding  and resulting  productivity
growth.  However,  further analysis  will prove  that this is only a part - not the most
important one - of the story.  At a deeper level  the main reason for unfavorable  labor
market outcomes  is insufficient job creation.  In fact, the job creation rate in Croatia  is
among  the  lowest  among  transition  economies  of  CEE.  Experience  shows  that
enterprise restructuring  and rising productivity do not have to entail job losses as long
as the economy  is able  to generates  a  sufficient  number of new jobs.  In an efficient
economy  with  a  flexible  labor  market  job  creation  goes  hand  in  hand  with  job
destruction,  with  new  expanding  firms  absorbing  labor  released  in  the  old  and
declining  finns.  Hence, the relevant question  is what limits the job creation potential
of  the Croatian  economy?  Why the Croatian economy does not generate  a sufficient
number  of jobs  to  offset  the  negative  impact  of enterprise  restructuring?  This
question is addressed in the next two sections.
-12-H. A STAGNANT  LABOR  MARKET: THE CHALLENGE  OF JOB CREATION
Declining  employment  and  rising unemploymeii.mean  that job  creation  in
Croatia  falls  short  of job  destruction.  The  job  creation'.potential  of the  Croatian
economy  is insufficient.  Why is this the case?  Why few jobs are being created and
unemployment  is growing?  There  are two.  prima  facie reasons.  First,  there may be
barriers  to entry by new  firms,  limiting  firm growth  and density  (number of firms
relative  to  population).  Second,  there  may  be  barriers  to expansion, encumbering
employment  growth  in  existing  firms.  Bel4ind  these,  tfiere'is  a  number of specific
factors  that  can  inhibit  firm  entry  and  expansion,  and thereby  job  creation.  They
include unfavorable  investment  climate'and poor business environment,  labor market
rigidities and high labor costs,  an inflexible'wage structufe.  In addition, new jobs that
are being  created  are  likely to  differ in  salient  characteristics  from old jobs that are
being destroyed.  This may  make the'transition  fromn old to new jobs costly and may
contribute to structural unemployment thro'ugh skill and spatial mismatches.
This section looks at the issues of firm entry and expansion,  and analyzes  in
more  detail job creation  and job destruction  in Croatia.  The  next  section examines
various factors behind the poor job creation record of the Croatian economy.
Firm formation
The  growth in the number.of new firms is critical for job creation.  Business
start-ups  create about one-third of new jobs in the economy,  a regularity observed in a
number of transition economies, -such as Bulgaria,  Lithuania and Poland (Rutkowski
2001b,  2002a,  2002b).  At the same  timhe,  firm density in transition economies tends
to be less  than in mature market economies  (Boeri and Martins, 2000).  Thus a major
challenge  of the transition is to encourage  firmn en'try in order to increase firm density
and thus the number of available jobs.  This involves an important structural  change:
the transition from a relatively smialltnumber  of large (publicly owned)  firms toward a
much larger number of smaller, private firms.
This process of growing number of small private firmns is already under way in
Croatia.  However,  it is accompanied  by the closures, of inefficient  firms, especially
after  1997.  As a result, the growth. in the oveiall riumber of firms has been wobbling.
The  number  of firms  is  presently  by  abou.t  two-thirds  higher than  it was  in  1993(Table 6).5  However, the number of firms in 2000 was below that in 1995.  All in all,
the rate of new enterprise growth was insufficient  to offset the employment reductions
taking place in existing firms.
Table 6  Firm growth by firm size,  1993-2000
Index of growth, 1993=100
Avg.
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  annuat
growth
Number offirms ('000)  139.7  168.3  174.5  182.0  174.3  168.5  165.1  7.4
Employment (1993=100)
All firms  97.5  92.4  92.3  93.0  92.2  89.7  92.9  -1.0
251+  93.3  85.3  81.5  79.7  76.4  72.9  72.0  -4.6
51 - 250  89.5  80.7  81.7  83.0  82.7  76.2  75.9  -3.9
-50  119.5  127.9  136.6  143.5  148.9  155.0  174.4  8.3
State owned  61.0  48.1  45.7  46.0  46.6  37.9  39.6  -12.4
Mixed  114.2  110.1  104.1  96.2  84.7  84.8  78.3  -3.4
Private  145.3  155.2  166.7  178.2  187.5  192.8  210.4  11.2
Note:  Data refer to registered  legal persons.
Source:  FINA,  Author's calculations.
5  Data refer to enterprises which are registered as legal persons.  Since a substantial proportion
of all enterprises are natural persons, the data presented may not be representative of all enterprises.
Moreover, there is likely to be a discrepancy between the number of registered enterprises and the
number of actually active enterprises,  the latter often being substantially smaller (EUROSTAT, 2000).
-14-In  some  other  transition  economies  the process  of new  firms  formation has
been much more dynamic than in Croatia.  For example in Poland the number of firms
increased by some 80 percent over the period  1995-2000,  implying an average annual
rate  of growth  of almost  13  percent,  which  is  much  higher  than  in  Croatia.6 The
example  of  Poland  shows  that  fast  firm  growth  does  not  protect  from  high
unemployment.  However,  the  unemployment  problem  would  have  been  far  more
serious if the firm growth had been slower.
A likely reason for the insufficient pace of new firm formation is high costs of
entry in Croatia, one of the highest among transition economies of CEE.  For example
Djankov et al.  (2000) report that the number of procedures  for entry is  14  in Croatia
(7  in Latvia,  9  in  Slovenia),  time  for  entry  is  58  days  (26  days  in Poland,  35  in
Slovenia), and monetary cost is 34 percent of GDP per capita (7% in Slovenia,  17% in
Bulgaria).  These  high  costs  are  bound to  significantly  slow  down the  rate  of new
enterprise  growth, with a detrimental effect on employment.  Consequently,  lowering
the costs of firm entry is a condition for faster job creation.
As  expected,  the  structure  of  employment  by  firm  size  has  changed.
Employment  in large firms fell by almost 5 percent during  1993-2000.  It also  fell  in
medium-sized  firms,  although  less precipitously  (by  about 4  percent).  At the  same
time,  employment  in  small  firms  increased  by  over  8  percent.  Looking  from  a
different  angle,  employment  is state owned firm decreased by over  12 percent while
in private firms  increased by 11  percent.  Thus the old sector, consisting of large  state
owned  enterprises  has  been  shrinking  whereas  the  new  sector,  consisting  of small
private firms  is expanding.  However,  these changes,  although  significant, have  been
rather modest  in comparison  with  leading reformers  (such  as  the Czech  Republic,
Hungary, or Lithuania).7
Although small enterprises'  share of employment has risen in Croatia, it is still
relatively  low.  Small  enterprises  (employing  fewer than  50 workers),  which  are  a
6  It  should be borne in mind that cross-country comparability of data on the number of firms is
limited.  For example in  some countries (Poland is  an example) there have been incentives to switch
from dependent employment to self-employment,  which has inflated the number of firms.
7  Recent comparable data on employment by private/public  sector or firm size are not available.
However,  using the private sector share in GDP as a proxy, one sees that private firms play a lesser  role
in  Croatia than in  more advanced transition economies.  For example, in  1999 the private  sector share
in GDP in  Croatia was somewhat above 60 percent, while it was around 80 percent in the Czech
Republic or Hungary or Estonia or Lithuania (World Bank,  2002).
-15-proxy for the  "new sector"  account for about 46 percent of total employment  (Table
7).  This means that the new sector is still underdeveloped in Croatia,  with important
implications for economic  and employment  growth.  As noted in World Bank (2002),
"[...]  there appears  to be a threshold  - of around  40 percent for the shares of small
enterprises in employment and value added - below which economies do not take off
in terms of growth."  (p. 40).  Croatia  has barely passed this threshold, and is lagging
behind leading reformers  where the share of employment in small enterprises is over
50  percent.  This  means  that the  new  sector - comprised  of small  private  firms  --
needs to grow  further and faster in order to enhance the job creation potential  of the
Croatian  economy.  As  it will  be shown  later,  it is small  private firms  who are the
engine  of job  creation  in  Croatia,  similarly  as  in  other  transition  and  market
economies.
Table 7 Employment  by firm size,  2001
Firm size  Share in total employment,
(number of employees)  %






500+ a)  20.4
a) Including respondents who did not know the size of their firm  (2.1%).
Source:  Labor Force Survey, 2001.2,  CBS; Authors calculations.
-16-To conclude, insufficient  growth of the new sector,  consisting largely of small.
private  firms,  is  one  cause  of  the  limited  job  creation  potential  of  the- Croatian
economy.  If  the  average  firm  size  goes  down  - as  it  does  in  Croatia  due  to
restructuring  - then  the only way  to increase  the  overall  number of jobs is  through
having  more firms.8 Entry of new firms  and the faster rate  of new enterprise  growth
is thus critical for the increase in employment and the reduction in unemployment.
Job creation and job destruction
High job destruction  is not the source of the employment problem in Croatia.
It is low job creation.  After all, the rate of job destruction  in Croatia is much lower
than in other transition economies,  and even lower than in mature market economies,
such s Germany and France.  Despite the very low rate of job destruction employment
decreased  in  Croatia because  the rate of job creation  is  still lower.  Thus the  key to
reduce unemployment  is not to protect old jobs, but to foster the creation of new jobs,
which  entails  removing  barriers  to  enterprise  expansion  (definitions  of job  creation
and destruction are provided in Box 3).
Table  8 documents  the stagnant nature of the Croatian labor market.  The job
creation  rate  in  Croatia  is  only  3.5  percent,  compared  with  almost  10  percent  in
Lithuania or 7 percent  in Bulgaria.  This means  that Croatia creates  less  than half as
many jobs  (relative  to  its  employment)  as more  dynamic  transition  economies.  . In
other  words,  Croatia  needs  to. at  least  double  its  rate  of job  creation  to achieve  a
degree of restructuring  similar to that in other transition, and 'Market economies.
8  This is by virtue of a simple identity:  employment-to-population  ratio = average firm size *
firm density.  If average firms size goes down then firm density must go up proportionately to maintain
the given level of employment.
-17-Box 3
Job Turnover and its Components
The gross job creation rate (JC) is defined as the sum of all employment gains in
expanding firms in a given year, expressed as a proportion of total employment at
the beginning of the year.
The gross job destruction rate (JD) is defined as a sum of all employment losses
in contracting  firms in a given year, expressed as a proportion of total employment
at the beginning of the year.
The job turnover rate (JT) is defined as the sum of the absolute value of the
change in employment in each finn, expressed as proportion of total employment.
Put differently, job tumover is the sum of the job creation and job destruction  rates
(i.e. JT = JC + JD).
The difference between JC and JD gives the rate of employment  growth (EG), or
the net job creation rate (i.e. EG = JC - JD).
The job reallocation rate (JR), also called "excess" job reallocation, is the job
tumover rate beyond that necessary to accommodate the net change in
employment.  Thus JR is the difference between JT and the absolute value of EG.
Alternatively,  JR equals to twice the JC or JD, whichever is smaller (i.e. JR = 2*
min{JC, JD).
The job reallocation rate is often used as an indicator of enterprise  restructuring.
Restructuring  is assumed to be the more intensive,  the more jobs are moved away
from contracting firms toward expanding  firms.  For example,  a job reallocation
rate of 20% means that 10% (20/2) of all jobs were shifted  from contracting firms
to expanding  firms.  Notice that that the degree  of  job reallocation is deternined
by the lower of the rates of  job creation  and job destruction.
The concept of job tumover is often confused with that of labor turnover.  The rate
of labor turnover is the sum of hires and separations.  However, not every hiring
means that a job was created, and not every separation means that a job was
destroyed.  A new job was created only if a hiring was not preceded by a
separation.  And a job was destroyed only if a separation was not followed by
hiring.  Thus, labor turnover encompasses job turnover.  The concept of labor
turnover refers to  the movements of persons,  that of job turnover is limited to
movements of jobs.Table 8 Job creation and job destruction: Croatia against selected  countries
(as percent of total employment)
Croatia  Bulgaria  Lithuania  Poland  France  Germany
2001  2000  1998-99  1998-99  1984-91  1983-90
Job creation  3.5  6.8  9.7  5.3  6.6  6.5
Job destruction  4.9  10.8  10.7  10.1  6.3  5.6
Employment growth a)  -1.4  -4.1  -0.9  -4.8  0.3  0.9
Job turnover  8.4  17.6  20.4  15.4  12.9  12.1
Job reallocation  7.0  13.5  19.4  10.5  12.6  11.2
Note: Continuing establishment only (i.e. business start-ups and closures are not included).
Definitions:
a) The employment growth  rate refers to the sample (which is limited to legal persons)
and is not necessarily consistent with the overall change in employment.
Sources:
Croatia:  Central  Bureau of Statistics, Author's calculations.
Bulgaria:  Rutkowski (2002b)
Lithuania: Rutkowski (2002a)
Poland: Rutkowski (2001)
OECD countries:  OECD  (1996)
The  low rate of job creation  is associated  with  a low rate of job  destruction.
Croatian  firms yearly  close 4.9 percent of all jobs, compared  with the job destruction
rate of 10-11  percent in the restructuring  transition economies and around  6 percent in
mature market economies.  At the first sight the low job destruction  rate may seem a
positive  phenomenon,  preventing  larger  employment  declines.  This is  not the  case
however.  The reason is that the low rate of job destruction  translates  into a  low rate
of job creation.  This is because  the creation  of new jobs necessitates  destruction  of
old jobs (World Bank, 2002).9  Or alternatively,  hiring is bound to be limited if firing
is  difficult  and  costly,  as  employers  avoid  hiring  to  minimize  the  future  costs  of
employment adjustment during the downturn.
Economic  costs  of low job flows  (turnover)  can be  substantial.  Limited  job
turnover implies that there are  limited efficiency  gains associated with reallocation  of
jobs away from less productive toward more productive  uses.  In other words, low job
turnover  entails  less  enterprise  restructuring  and  less  associated  productivity
9  This is because  resources (including labor)  locked in  old jobs need to be released to become
available for newjobs.  This argument assumes that either the pool of unemployed is small (which is
not the case in Croatia),  or that unemployment is structural, i.e.  that the skill required (and/or location
of) by new jobs differ from the skills possessed (or location of) by the unemployed.
-19-improvements.'0 Thus eventually  low job turnover can translate  into lower rate of
economic growth.
Indeed, the Croatian economy - unlike  other transition economies  -- does not
seem- to. undergo  a  process  of intensive  enterprise  restructuring.  In Croatia  only  7
percent of all-jobs  are  annually reallocated from  contracting  firms toward expanding
firms.  This,is again much less than in the restructuring  transition economies  and less
than in mature market economies.  For example, in Lithuania the job reallocation rate
accounts  for'over  l9'percent and  in  Bulgaria  for close  to  14  percent.  This clearly
points to a stagnant nature of the Croatian labor market.
Low job'turnover seems to rule out inter-sectoral shifts  as an important factor
accounting for unemployment in Croatia.  As relatively few jobs are being eliminated
and created  in Croatia,  the problem  of the  skill or spatial mismatch  between the old
and new jobs does not have much weight.  There are relatively few worker transitions
between  the  old and  the  new  sector.  This  is in  strong contrast  to the restructuring
transition  economies,  where  frictions  associated with  movements  from old to  new
jobs, characteristic of structural changes,  significantly contribute to unemployment.'
To  summarize,  job  destruction  is  low  in  Croatia,  but  so  is,  and  not
independently, job creation.  In a way, the limited creation of new jobs is a price for
the  slow destruction  of old jobs.  Low job turnover  implies  slow  reallocation  of
resources,  including labor,  away  from less productive uses toward  more productive
uses.  The  cost  of the  delayed  restructuring  is  lower  than  otherwise  possible
productivity and long-term output growth.
Job turnover byfirin ownership and size
Although the overall job turnover rate is low in Croatia, there are some sectors
of'the economy  which  are  more  dynamic  than  others.  Notably,  small  and private
firms create - as well as destroy - more jobs than larger and state owned firms (Table
9).  The job creation rate in the private  sector at about 6 percent is nearly three times
10  We focus here on the aspect restructuring consisting in reallocation of resources across units
improvements (i.e.  on allocative  efficiency)  and associated productivity gains.  We leave aside the
issue of  restructuring within firm consisting in productivity improvements  due to technological and
organi2ational changes, which not necessarily  entail labor shedding.
"1  This does not rule out that unemployment in Croatia has an important structural component, as
the unemployed  may lack the skills necessary to successfully compete for available jobs.
-20-as high as in the SOE sector.  However,  the job destruction rate in the private sector is
also much higher than in the public  sector (7  and 2 percent, respectively).
Table 9 Job creation and job destruction by sector, 2001
(as percent of total employment)
Job  Job  Job  Employment  Job  Shamreplen
Sector  creation  destruction  turnover  growth  reallocation employment
Ownership
Public
Firms  2.2  1.9  4.1  .0.2  3.8  27.5
Institutions  3.1  4.5  7.6  -1.4  6.2  25.9
Private  6.2  7.1  13.3  -0.9  12.4  22.1
Mixed  3.0  6.7  9.7  -3.7  5.9  24.5
Size (employment)
-50  6.9  6.0  13.0  0.9  12.1  13.7
51 - 250  3.8  5.7  9.5  -1.8  7.7  38.0
251+  2.2  4.0  6.2  -1.7  4.5  48.3
Activity
Agriculture  2.4  6.0  8.4  -3.6  4.8  3.8
Non-agricultural  business sector  4.1  6.0  10.1  -1.9  8.2  67.8
Non-business sector  2.2  2.1  4.3  0.1  4.2  28.4
Firm status a)
Business start-ups  1.7  na  na  na  na  na
Continuing firms  8.1  5.2  13.2  18.4  31.7  na
Closures  na  0.5  na  na  na  na
na = not applicable
Notes:
Data refer to establishments defined by economic activity, rather than firms. Continuing firms only.
a)  Data on firm status come from a  different source than the other data and are not directly comparable.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, FINA, Authores calculations.
-21-Equally  pronounced  are  the  differences  in job turnover between  small  and
large  firms.  In  small  firms  (up  to  50  workers)  the  job  creation  rate  is almost  7
percent,  compared  with  slightly  over  2  percent  in  large  firms  (over  250  workers).
Small firms  close  6 percent of their jobs per year,  while large  firms 4 percent.  This
implies  that that the net job  creation  (employment  growth )  is positive  in the small
finn sector and negative in the large firm sector.
The  above  data  provide  an  exemplification  of  the  claimn  that  higher  job
creation  goes  hand  in hand  with  higher job destruction.  In other  words,  high job
creation  sectors  tend to be  high job turnover  sectors.  Put still differently,  old jobs
need to be eliminated for new jobs to be created.
Although  some sectors  are more dynamic  than the others in Croatia,  it should
be emphasized that even the relatively more dynamic sectors are characterized by low
job  turnover.  In  particular,  job  turnover  is  small  private  firms  in  Croatia  is
substantially  less than in  more  dynamic  transition  economies.  For  example,  the job
reallocation  rate  in  small  firms  (employing  less  than  50  workers)  in  Croatia  is  12
percent,  while  in  Bulgaria  and Lithuania  is  about  twice  as  high  (24%  and  26%,
respectively).  Similarly, the job reallocation rate in the Croatian private sector is half
of that in Bulgaria.  This is indeed a  dramatic  differences,  clearly  demonstrating that
labor market rigidities affect the Croatian economy at large, rather than only the SOE
sector.
To  conclude,  there  are  visible  inter-sectoral  differences  in job  turnover  in
Croatia.  In particular,  as  one would  have  expected,  small  private  firms  are  more
dynamic than large SOEs.  What is startling however, is that even these more dynamic
segments  of the economy look rather unimpressive when compared  to similar sectors
in more  dynamic  transition economies.  This means  that institutional  barriers  to job
creation are pervasive,  and not limited to particular  segments of the economy  (e.g. to
the  SOE  sector).  While  the  governance  factor  can  contribute  to the  slow  pace  of
restructuring in SOEs, it seems that it is mainly institutions  and regulations that hinder
restructuring  in the private  sector.  Given the private  sector's dynamic potential,  the
best  way  to  foster  job  creation  is  thus  to  remove  institutional  and  regulatory
constraints on its development.
-22-Job turnover  by industry
Industrial  restructuring, which is under way in Croatia,  involves the decline of
some  old  industries  and a  simultaneous  expansion  of other industries, where  Croatia
has  comparative  advantage.  At  the  same  time,  international  evidence  shows  that
restructuring  largely  occurs  within industries,  that  is resources  (including  labor)  are
reallocated away from contracting  toward expanding firms within an industry.  Which
industries  create jobs and  which eliminate  them?  Which industries  are restructuring
the fastest in Croatia?
Table  10, Panel A shows ten industries with highest rates of gross job creation.
These include wholesale trade,  manufacturing of transport equipment,  so called other
business  activities,  manufacturing  of metal products  and  car  sale.
12 These  are  the
industries  which provide  best job opportunities  for persons  looking  for work,  even
though  in  some  cases  (e.g.  wholesale  trade)  they not  only create  but  also destroy  a
large  number  of jobs.  Nonetheless  such  high  job  turnover  is  beneficial  for  the
unemployed as entails more hiring and thus better chances to escape unemployment.
The  top  10  industries in job  destruction  include  manufacturing  of RTV  and
communication  equipment,  manufacturing  of basic  metals,  manufacturing  of petrol
products,  manufacturing  of textile  and leather  products  (Table  10,  Panel  B).  These
are the industries  where  the risk of job loss is the  largest,  although in some  cases  it
may coincide - due to high job turnover - with good hiring prospects.
The relation between  gross job creation and gross job destruction determines whether
an industry is expanding, i.e. creates jobs on a net basis, or is shrinking, i.e.  eliminates
jobs on a net basis.  The fastest growing industries  in Croatia include manufacturing
of transport equipment,  car sale, other business activities,  and manufacturing of metal
products  (Table  10,  Panel  C).  The  industries  which  are  shrinking  include
manufacturing  of RTV  and  communication  equipment,  manufacturing  of petrol
products,  manufacturing  of textiles,  hotels  and  restaurants,  and  manufacturing  of
wood and paper products (Table  10,  Panel  D).  This is an interesting combination,  as
it contradicts  the popular view that the manufacturing  sector is  shrinking  during the
transition,  and  the  service  sector  is  expanding.  After  all,  some  manufacturing
industries (e.g. manufacturing  of transport equipment)  do expand,  while some service
12  The category "other business activities"  includes legal services, accounting,  business
counseling,  marketing, personnel recruitment,  etc.
-23-industries contract (e.g. hotels and restaurants).  Obviously, these exceptions, however
important, do not contravene  the overall trend toward a higher share of services in the
Croatian economy.  This general trend has i;mportant labor market implications,  as it
calls for the change in the  skiil structure  of the Croatian workforce,  a gradual  move
away from manual skills,  essenfial in the manufacturing based economy, toward new
skills  (such  as  communication,  language,  computer  skills)  essential  in the  service
based economy.
-24-Table 10 Job turnover by industry, 2001
A.  Top  10  industries  with  highest  B.  Top  10  industries  with  highest
rates of gross job creation  rates of gross job destruction
JobJo
Industry  creation  Share in  Jnuty  detutob  Share in
rate  employment  Industry  destruction  employment
Wholesale  RTV  &
trade  10.5  2.8  communication  12.3  0.5
Transport
equipment  9.4  2.2  Basic metals  11.0  0.7
Other  business
activities  8.9  2.2  Petrol products  9.9  0.7
Metal products  7.5  1.4  Textiles  9.5  1.1
Car  sale  &
repair  7.3  1.0  Leather  9.5  1.2
Wholesale
Machinery  7.3  1.2  trade  9.3  2.8
Basic metals  6.4  0.7  Retail trade  8.8  5.1
Rubber  and
plastics  5.8  0.7  Wood  8.8  1.3
Construction  5.8  5.5  Machinery  8.5  1.2
Electric
Leather  5.7  1.2  equipment  8.0  1.4
C.  Top  10  industries  with  highest  D.  Top  10  industries  with  largest
employment growth  employment decline
Employme  Share in  Employmen  Share  in
Industry  nt growth  employmen  Industry  t  growth employment
rate  t  rate
Transport  RTV  &
equipment  8.1  2.2  communication  -11.4  0.5
Car  sale  &
repair  3.5  1.0  Petrol products  -9.7  0.7
Other  business
activities  2.7  2.2  Textiles  -6.4  1.1
Meta prouct  1.61.4Hotels  &
Public  1.6  1.4  restaurants  -6.1  3.8
administration  1.3  6.1  Wood  -5.7  1.3
Wholesale
trade  1.2  2.8  Paper  -5.6  0.6
Education  1.2  9.9  Electricity  &
Post & telecom  0.8  3.1  Financial
Rubber  &Fiacl
plastic  0.7  0.7  intermediation  -4.9  2.7
Petrol  Furniture  -4.7  1.6
extraction  0.4  0.7  Basic metals  -4.6  0.7
-25-E. Top 10 industries with highest rate of job
reallocation
Job  Share in
Industry  reallocatio  employmen
n rate  t
Wholesale
trade  18.7  2.8
Machinery  14.6  1.2
Basic metals  12.8  0.7
Other business
activities  12.5  2.2
Metal products  11.8  1.4
Construction  11.5  5.5
Leather  11.4  1.2
Retail trade  11.3  5.1
Rubber  &
plastic  10.2  0.7
Electric
equipment  8.1  1.4
Note:  The  raking  is  based  on  industries  whose  share  in
total employment is at least 0.5%.
Source:  Central Bureau  of Statistics; Authors calculations.
Apart  form  the  change  in  the  industry  structure,  a  less  visible  but equally
important change of the job structure  is under way in Croatia.  Within industries lower
productivity  jobs  are  being  destroyed  and  simultaneously  presumable  higher
productivity  jobs,  often  requiring  different,  higher  skills,  are  being  created.  Such
dynamic,  restructuring  industries  include  wholesale  trade,  manufacturing  of
machinery,  manufacturing  of basic  metals,  and other  business  activities  (Table  10,
Panel  E).  Again,  it  is  noteworthy,  the  restructuring  sectors  include  both
manufacturing  and service industries.
The  presumption  that  job  reallocation  involves  the  elimination  of  less
productive  jobs  and  the  simultaneous  creation  of more  productive  jobs  cannot be
substantiated  directly  for  Croatia,  as  necessary  information  is  lacking.  However,
international  evidence  provides  strong  support to the hypothesis that job reallocation
tends to bring about substantial productivity  gains.  For  example, Foster et al.  (2002)
argue that  "a substantial  fraction of aggregate  productivity  growth is associated  with
the  reallocation  of  outputs  and  inputs  from  less  productive  to  more  productive
individual  microeconomic  units."  (p.  2)  For  example,  "in the  U.S.,  roughly  thirty
percent of productivity  growth (measured  as either multifactor or labor productivity)
over a ten-year horizon is accounted for by more productive entering plants displacing
-26-less  productive  exiting  plans."  (p.  2).  This  connection  between  reallocation  and
productivity  dynamics holds  for both manufacturing  and  service  sectors.  The  link
between job reallocation  and productivity growth is also demonstrated  in a summary
article  by  Bartelsman  and  Doms  (2000).  There  is  no  reasons  to assume  that  the
connection between reallocation and productivity observed in other countries does not
hold in Croatia.  Accordingly,  those sectors in which job reallocation is relatively high
in  Croatia  are  a  likely  to  be  the  main  contributors  to  the  aggregate  productivity
growth.
What  is  the  impact  of job  flows  and  restructuring  on  employment  growth
within industry?  This  is an empirical  question because  as we have just seen, high job
destruction does not necessarily imply a fall in employment,  as high job creation does
not necessarily  imply a growth in employment.  It is only the interactions, joint impact
of job creation  and destruction  that determines  changes  in industry  employment.  It
turns  out  that  in  Croatia  employment  growth  within  industry  is  more  strongly
negatively  correlated  with job destruction  (r=-0.62),  than  positively  correlated  with
job  creation  (r=-0.56).  This  is a rather  untypical pattern,  as  in other  countries  (e.g.
Lithuania,  Poland)  employment  growth  is  strongly  correlated  with job creation  and
only  weakly  with job destruction.  In other  words,  in Croatia  employment  changes
depend mainly on the pace of job destruction, while in other transition economies they
depend mainly on the pace of job creation.  The pattern prevailing in Croatia may give
rise  to an  misleading  interpretation  that  forestalling  job  destruction  is  the way  to
prevent  employment  decline.  However,  the  experience  from  other  restructuring
transition economies  points  in  exactly  the  opposite  direction:  fostering  job creation
rather  than  preventing  job  destruction  is  the  best  means  to promote  employment
growth.  The job destruction  rate is already very low in Croatia,  and thus there hardly
is room  to  lower  it still  further.  Accordingly,  the  only  possible  way to  reverse  the
negative employment trend is to increase job creation. 13
Croatia  is  also  untypical  in  that  there  is  no  correlation  between  industry
employment  growth  and  enterprise  restructuring.  In  contrast,  in  other  transition
economies  (Lithuania,  Poland)  there  is a positive,  albeit not very  strong,  correlation
between the rate of  job reallocation  and the rate of employment growth, meaning that
those industries where enterprise restructuring is more intensive  tend to growth faster.
One possible explanation is that the magnitude  of job reallocation  in Croatia - which
13  Of course,  a high job creation  rate by itself does not ensure  that employment  growth is
positive, as it can be outbalanced by a high job destruction rate.  However, given the job destruction
rate, the higher the job creation  rate, the faster is employment  growth.
-27-is  significantly  smaller  than  in  the  restructuring  transition  economies  --  is  not
sufficient to spur visible employment changes.  If so, this is yet another  argument for
making  the Croatian  labor market more fluid.
It is noteworthy,  that job creation is correlated with job destruction in Croatia,
which means that industries  which  destroy  more jobs (relative  to their employment)
also  tend  to  create  more  jobs.  Although  the  correlation  is  weak  (r=0.30),  it  is
statistically  significant.  This  again  implies  that job  destruction  by  itself  is  not  a
negative  phenomenon.  High job  destruction  can  go  hand  in hand  with  high  job
creation.  For example, in the wholesale trade sector  the job destruction rate is high
(over  9  percent),  but  the job  creation  rate  is  still higher  (over  10  percent).  The
problem  arises  only  when  high  job  destruction  is  not  accompanied  by  high  job
creation.  Unfortunately,  this  is  often  the  case  in  Croatia,  where  in  majority  of
industries (36 out of 54) job creation falls short of  job destruction.
To summarize,  while the overall level of job turnover is very low in Croatia,
there  are  some  industries  which  exhibit  more  dynamism  and  where  enterprise
restructuring  is more  advanced.  However,  unlike  other  transition  economies,  these
restructuring industries  do not grow faster than non-restructuring ones.
Presently  the industry employment  growth in Croatia  is mainly influenced by
the rate  of job destruction.  This  is in contrast  to restructuring  transition economies,
where employment growth is largely determined by the rate of job creation.  Since the
rate of job destruction  is already very low in Croatia,  protecting unviable jobs in the
old  sectors  is  not  a  sustainable  strategy.  Croatia's  main  problem  is  not  high job
destruction, but low job creation.  Accordingly,  the only way to increase employment
is to foster job creation.
Job turnover by region
Is the  Croatian  labor market  stagnant  across  the  country,  or there  are more
dynamic  regions,  where job  flows and restructuring  are more intensive?  It turns out
that job  creation  as  well  as job  destruction  rates  are  low  throughout  the  country.
There  is  no  single  region  with  a  dynamic  labor  market  and  high  job  turnover.
Although the job creation  and job destruction rates  do vary by region, the variability
is limited, ranging from modest to very low values (Figure 2).
-28-Figure 2 Job flows by region
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In  the most depressed  regions  virtually  no  new jobs  are  beingscreated.  For
example,  in the  Li6ko-senjska  and  Sisacko-moslavacka  counties  the job  creation  rate
is  less than  2  pecent.  For  comparison,  in  the most  depressed regions  of Bulgaria -
another  high unemployment  Balcan  country  -- the job creation  rate is o  ver two times
higher!  -However, even  in the  regions  with highest job creation  rates, which  include
Vukovarsko-srijemska  and  Vara2dinska  counties,  the job  creation  rate  is  under  6
percent.  Again  this  is  humble  in  comparison  with  Bulgaria,  where  in  the  most
dynamic.-regions  the job creation rate  (in continuing  firms) exceeds  8 percent.  Thus,
job  opportunities  are  limited  across  the  country,  but  in  the  most  depressed  regions
they hardly exist.
~In the majority (1  7 out of 22) of Croatian regions job destruction rates exceed
job creatiQn  rates, implying  declining employment  levels.  However, job destruction
rates are  not, high in  absolute  termns.  In  the most  depressed  regions,  such  as Lifko-
senjska and  Sisa6ko-moslava6ka  counties,  the job destruction rate  does not exceed  9
percent.  In comparison,  in Bulgaria job  destruciton rates  in regions  most affected  by
restructuring  approach  15  percent.  In most Croatian regions the job destruciton rates
vary  around  4-6  percent,  which  is  not much.  This  is  additional  evidence  that  the
-29-problem  faced by  the Croatian  economy  is  that of low job  creation,  not high  job
destruction.
Regions  with  low  job  creation  tend  to  have  high  job  destruction.  More
generally,  there is a negative correlation  between the job creation and job destruction
rates across regions.  This implies  that regions  differ little  in terms of job flows, but
they differ  quite substantially  in terms of employment growth.  There  are depressed
regions,  where  job  destruction  is  high  and  job  creation  low  (Licko-senjska  and
Sisacko-moslavacka  counties)  , and there are  thriving regions  (such  as Vukovarsko-
srijemska and Varazdinska  counties)  where job destruction is low and job creation is
relatively  high.  However,  in both depressed  and thriving  regions job turnover  is at a
similar level,  meaning  that Croatian  regions  do not differ  significantly  in  terms of
labor market dynamics,  although they differ in terms of economic prosperity.  This is
in  contrast  to  the  pattern  observed  in  Bulgaria,  where  the  correlation  between  job
creation  and  job  destruction  is  positive,  i.e.  high  job  destruction  tends  to  be
accompanied by high job creation.  The pattern prevailing in Croatia, where high job
destruction  is  accompanied  by  low  job  creation  clearly  points  to  inadequate  job
creation as a main source of poor labor market outcomes.
Regional  employment  growth  in Croatia  is  strongly  influenced  by both  the
pace  of job  creation  and job  destruction.14 As  there  is  not  much  scope  to  lower
already low job destruction  rates, the only way to foster regional  employment  growth
is through encouraging  faster job creation.
To summarize,  regional analysis  has proved  that the labor market  is stagnant
across  the  country  in  Croatia,  that  there  are no  regions  with  high job turnover  and
large job reallocation.  Our analysis has also shown that the principal problem  is that
of insufficient  job  creation,  which  is  low  across  the  country,  not  that  of high job
destruction.  Thus  the main challenge  and policy  imperative is to raise the pace job
creation.  It may involve an increase, not a decrease,  in the pace of job destruction,  to
support reallocation of jobs from unprofitable to profitable  firms.
Determinants of job creation
In the previous  section we established  that small  private  firm have  a higher
rate of job creation than large publicly  owned  enterprises.  More  generally,  one  can
ask what explains job creation.  What firm characteristics  that are conducive for job
14  This is in contrast to industry employment growth, which was mainly influenced by the pace
of  job destruction.
-30-creation?  What  kind  of  firms  increase  employment?  This  section  shows  that
employment  tends to  increase most in firms which have  high labor productivity  and
low unit labor costs,  and in firms which are capital intensive and investing.
We examine  three  groups of factors related  to job creation.  The  first  group
consists  of factors  that may  be  associated  with job  creation  but by  itself do  not
influence  it.  An example  is firm size.  Small firm  size does not by and of itself cause
employment  growth,  but  small firms  tend to create  on average  more jobs than  large
firms.
The second  group  consists of factors,  which  influence job creation,  but at the
same time  are themselves  influenced by changes  in employment.  Examples  include
profitability,  productivity  or  labor  cost,  which  are  likely  to  have  an  impact  on
employment,  but  simultaneously  they  vary  with  changes  in employment.  There  is
"reverse  causality" here and such factors  are called endogenous.
The third group  comprises true determinants of job creation,  that is factors that
influence employment but are independent of it.  Examples include access to credit, or
export orientation.  Firms,  which have  access  to  credit,  or  to foreign  markets,  may
find it easier to expand and  thus increase  employment.  These factors  are referred  to
as exogenous.
The analysis  of the impact of these factors  on firm employment  is carried  out
in  two  stages.  First  regression  analysis  is  performed  in  order  determine  an
independent  or net impact  of various  firm  characteristics  on  firm  employment.  By
using the regression  analysis one  can  separate  the effect  of a particular variable  on
employment from that of all other variables,  which are held constant.  Second,  data on
bivariate  associations  between  selected firm  characteristics and employment  changes
are presented to illustrate the most important relationships.
The  results  of the  regression  analysis  are  presented  in  Table  11.15  Main
findings of the analysis can be summarized as follows.
Productivity  improvements  coupled  with  wage  moderation  are  key  factors
contributing for faster employment growth.  All  else being equal, higher productivity
firms  tend  to  create  more jobs.'6 A  ten percent  higher productivity  implies  almost
is  The analysis of determinants of job creation  was done using a different data set from that used
to calculate the job creation and job destruction rates.  See Annex ## for the dataset description.
16  To reduce the endogeneity bias we use lagged values of independent variables.  Specifically,
employment change is measured from 2000 to 2001  while, the productivity level,  say, relates to the
year 2000.
-31-half a  percentage  point  faster  annual  employment  growth.  This  contradicts  the
popular  view  that  productivity  improvements  imply  employment  loses.  To  the
contrary, productivity gains turn out to be beneficial  for job creation.  It is noteworthy
that  a similar  result  was  obtained  for  Lithuania,  proving  that  a  positive  impact  of
higher productivity  on job creation is not country specific (Rutkowski,  2002).
It  is  important,  however,  that  the  gains  of  higher  productivity  are  not
"consumed"  in  the  form  of proportionately  higher  wages.  This  is  because  the
beneficial employment effect of higher labor productivity realizes itself through lower
unit labor costs.  If unit labor costs increase - as a result of wages rising in excess of
productivity  - then employment  decreases.  According  to the model,  other  things
held constant,  a 10 percent increase  in unit labor costs would results in a 3.6 percent
fall in the firm employment level.  Firms which lower unit labor costs tend to expand,
those who do not often  contract.  The lowering  of unit  labor costs - mainly through
higher  productivity  - is  thus  critical  for employment  growth  both  at the  firm  and
aggregate level.
-32-Table 11 OLS estimation of the employment equation
Regression models
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
emplOO  0.946  0.939  0.941  0.950
223.80  211.28  213.54  209.84
Ownership (public)
private  -0.016  0.003  -0.010  0.005
0.64  0.11  0.33  0.18
mixed  0.035  0.040  0.036  0.037
0.93  1.00  0.90  0.84
export  0.059  0.036  0.047  ***  0.041
5.49  3.12  4.07  ***  3.51
credit  0.019  -0.019  -0.019  0.000
1.66  1.63  1.65  0
invest  0.074  ***  0.075  0.073  ***  0.072
11.88  12.15  12.04  10.84
ktol  0.020  **  0.025  ***  0.035
6.17  7.51  9.91








industry  no  yes  yes  yes
constant  0.114  -0.613  -0.040  -0.090
No. of obs.  8961  8822  8822  6923
R 2 0.907  0.911  0.910  0.917
Dependent variable: log of average employment in 2001
Definitions of explanatory variables:
emplOO = log of average employment in  2000
export = 1  if a firm sells its products aborad, 0 otherwise
credit = 1  if a  firm has a debt towards financial institutions, 0 otherwise
capform = log of the index of fixed-capital growth  over one year.
ktol = log of capital-to-labor ratio
wage = log of average monthly wage
labcost= log of labor costs as a share of sales
productiv=log productivty (sales per employee).
profitab  log of the ratio of operating profit to sales
industry = 2-digit NACE classification
All explanatory variables refer to 2000, i.e. are lagged one year.
Absolute values of the t-statistics are in  italics
t-statistics were caluclated using Huber-White  robust standard errors.
- significant at the I percent level, ** - significant at the 5 percent level,
* - signifcantat the  10 percent level.
-33-Firms that are  capital  intensive,  i.e.  where the  capital-to-labor  ratio  is high,
expand  employment  faster than more  labor intensive  firms.  This is not an intuitive
results  and  therefore  it  is worth  emphasizing.  Controlling  for the  impact of other
variables, a 10 percent increase in the capital-to-labor ratio contributes  around 0.4 of a
percentage  point  to  the  firm's  rate  of annual  employment  growth.  Again,  similar
result  was  obtained  for Lithuania,  supporting  the  relevance  of capital  intensity  for
employment  generation.  It should  be  stressed  that apart  from this  direct  impact of
capital intensity on job creation,  there is an indirect  impact, as higher capital-to-labor
ratio usually leads to higher labor productivity,  which we already know is conducive
to job creation.
If capital intensity is beneficial for employment,  then  so should be investment,
which increases the  stock of capital.  The  model shows  that this is  indeed the  case.
Other things  being  constant.  a ten percent increase  in the investment rate  (i.e.  faster
fixed capital formation)  leads  to employment  growing  faster by about 0.3 percentage
points, which is statistically highly significant.
It  should  be  noted,  that  the  direction  of the  employment  effect  investment
cannot  be  determined  a priori.  On the  one  hand,  investment  can  entail  mainly  a
switch toward a more capital-intensive  technology  with a relatively small  increase  in
output.  In  such  a  case  capital  is  substituted  for  labor  with  a  resulting  fall  in
employment.  On the other hand, investment can entail both an increase in the capital-
to-labor  ratio,  and  an increase  in output  large  enough  to bring  about  an increase  in
employment.  In the  second  case,  capital  and  labor  are  gross  complements  (despite
being substitutes in production)  because of the scale effect (i.e.,  the increase  in output
brought  about  by  investment)  dominates  the  substitution  effect  (i.e.,  the  fall  in
employment due to an increased use of capital).  The regression results indicate that in
Croatia  the  scale  effect of fixed capital  formation dominates  the  substitution  effect,
with a positive employment impact.
Contrary to common perception, more profitable firms do not create more jobs
than less profitable ones.  Although the relevant  regression coefficient is positive  and
statistically significant,  its value is very small.  For example,  a  10 percent increase  in
profitability  in  an  average  firm  (employing  15  workers)  would have  no observable
impact  on the  employment  level.  Thus  firm  profitability hardly  has  an independent
impact on employment  growth.  If more profitable firms employ more workers, this is
-34-due to higher productivity  and lower unit costs, which boost profitability,  rather than
due to higher profitability by and of itself.  Improving  labor productivity and lowering
costs  is the way to increase  both profits  and employment.  Again it is  interesting to
note that the same results was obtained for Lithuania.
Firm which export their products tend to create more jobs than firms which do
not.  This  is  consistent  with  a  common  view  that  an  access  to  foreign  markets
facilitates firm expansion and employment  growth.  The  employment effect of export
orientation  is  substantial:  all  else  being  equal,  exporting  firms  increase  their
employment  by  around  4  percentage  points  faster  than  non-exporting  firms.  For
example,  if an average  non-exporting  firm  increased  its  employment  by somewhat
over 2 percent in 2001  over the  previous year,  an average  exporting  firm  increased
employment by over 6 percent.  This suggests that an increase  in Croatia's exports is
likely  to  engender  employment  growth,  directly  as  well  as  indirectly  through
productivity  improvements  necessary  for  firms  to  effectively  compete  in the  global
economy.  As  with  other  variables,  the  strong  link  between  export  growth  and
employment growth has also been observed in Lithuania.
Ceteris paribus,  firms, which have access to credit, do not generate more jobs
than firm,  which do not.  After all, the data indicate that firms which received credit
created less jobs than firms  which did  not, although  this negative  effect is in some
specifications  is  statistically  insignificant.  This  suggests  that  credit does  not  go to
firms with  growth potential,  but instead goes  to inefficient  but well connected  finms.
This sort of "soft lending" to a narrow  group of privileged firms implies misallocation
of resources and hinders rather than fosters firm expansion and employment growth.'7
Given  that credit  can play  an  important  role  in supporting  firm  expansion  and job
creation,  the observed negative relationship  between access  to credit and job creation
should be of concern.  The  issue  warrants  further  investigation,  and if necessary,  a
corrective policy action.
Interestingly,  the effect of ownership on employment vanishes once other firm
characteristics are controlled for.  Other things being equal, private  firms do not create
17  In the sample (which  consists predominantly of small firms), only one firm in five was using
credit as a source of financing.  At the same time, according to the World Business Environment
Survey (2001),  poor access to credit is a major constraint to firm development in  Croatia.  As much as
55 percent of Croatian firms considered access to credit as an important obstacle, which significantly is
more than in  most other countries in  the region.  For example, in  Hungary,  Poland or Slovenia  only
about one-third  of firms  cite  access to credit as an important  obstacle for expansion.
-35-more jobs than public  firms.  However,  in reality,  other things  are not being  equal,
and  private  firms  differ  in  salient  characteristics  from  public  firms.  These
characteristics  associated  with private  ownership  cause private  firms to create  more
jobs than public  firms.  Thus,  although  firm  ownership  has no  independent  impact,
privatization still is the best way to improve firm performance, including employment
growth.
Finally,  all  else  equal,  small  firms  tend  to  growth  faster  than  larger  ones.
However,  the faster  rate  of employment  growth  does  not necessarily  translate  in  a
larger  number  of jobs  created.  To  see  this  imagine,  two  firms,  one  employing  25
workers and the other 50 workers.  Assume that the larger firm increases employment
by  10  percent  over  one  year,  i.e.  by 5 workers.  Then  our model  implies  that the
smaller  firm  will  increase  employment  by  12.8  percent,  i.e.  by  3.2  workers.  The
smaller  firm  will  create  more  jobs  relative  to  its  initial  employment,  but  less  in
absolute terms.  But the difference  in the number of jobs created is rather  small.  So,
the net impact of firm size on employment generation should not be overstated.
Table  12 provides an additional  illustration for the relationships between  firm
characteristics  and employment performance.  The positive impact of productivity on
employment  growth comes out very distinctly.  While low productivity firms (bottom
quintile)  decreased  employment  by  over  5 percent  in 2001,  high  productivity  firms
(top  quintile)  increased  it  by  over  11  percent.  Similarly  pronounced  is  the  link
between job creation  and labor  costs.  Twenty  percent of firms with the  lowest unit
labor cost increased  their employment  by  14 percent,  while  twenty percent  of firms
with the highest unit labor cost decreased employment by 3 percent.
-J6-Table 12 Changes in employment  by firm category, 2000-2001
Number of  Average  Change  in employment,
Firm characteristics (2000)  firms  employment  2000-2001
(sample)")  (2000)  Absolute  Relative
(persons)  (%)
All firms  9576  14.9  0.4  2.4
Size (employment)
Micro (1-10)  8134  2.9  0.3  10.5
Small (11-50)  1071  21.0  0.4  2.0
Medium  (51-100)  153  72.9  0.3  0.4
Large (101+)  218  389.4  1.9  0.5
Ownership
Public  127  254.2  0.0  0.0
Private  9184  8.6  0.4  4.3
Cooperative  59  16.9  -0.8  -4.5
Mixed  206  146.9  0.3  0.2
Wage
Very low (1st quintile)  1905  6.2  -0.1  -0.9
Low (2nd quintile)  1905  9.6  0.2  1.9
Medium (3rd quintile)  1903  9.5  0.2  2.6
High (4th quintile)  1904  13.7  0.6  4.4
Very high (5th quintile)  1904  35.7  0.8  2.3
Productivity
Very low (1st quintile)  1891  9.5  -0.5  -5.2
Low (2  quintile)  1890  13.6  0.0  0.0
Medium  (3rd quintile)  1890  24.1  0.3  1.3
High (4t quintile)  1890  17.6  0.8  4.5
Very high (5th quintile)  1890  10.3  1.2  11.3
Unit labor costs
Very low (1st quintile)  1881  8.3  1.2  14.0
Low (2nd quintile)  1880  8.8  0.4  5.0
Medium (3rd quintile)  1880  18.8  0.5  2.5
High (4th quintile)  1880  24.9  0.1  0.6
Very high (5th quintile)  1880  14.7  -0.4  -3.0
Capital intensity (capital-to-labor ratio)
Very low (1st quintile)  1835  6.3  0.0  0.1
Low (2  quintile)  1835  5.3  0.2  3.5
Medium  (3rd quintile)  1835  6.2  0.3  4.9
High (4th quintile)  1835  14.1  0.5  3.6
Very high (5th quintile)  1835  45.1  0.8  1.8
Net investment (% increase in  fixed assets)
Negative or zero  5730  12.5  -0.2  -1.4
Up to 25%  1163  42.1  1.4  3.3
More than 25%  2068  9.7  1.4  14.1
Profitability  (Y.)
Negative or zero  2152  19.6  -0.4  -1.8
10  5824  15.3  0.6  3.9
25  1107  7.7  0.5  6.4
More than 25%  368  6.5  0.3  3.8
Access to credit
-37-Change in employment, Number of  Average  2000-2001
Firm characteristics  (2000)  firms  employment
(sample)a)  (2000)  Absolute  Relative
(persons)  (%)
Yes  1878  50.3  0.6  1.2
No  7698  6.2  0.3  4.7
Export orientation
Exporting firms  1753  46.4  0.7  1.5
Non-exporting firms  7823  7.8  0.3  3.6
Definitions of variables:
Access to credit = liabilities to credit institutions.
Net investment = increase in the value of fixed tangible assets over one year.
Capital-to-labor ratio = value of fixed tangible assets over employment.
Productivity = sales over employment.
Unit labor costs = wages and social security contributions over sales.
Profitability = operating  profit over sales
a) Active at both  January and December 2001.
Source:  FINA, Author's calculations.
In this context a  seemingly positive association  between job creation  and the
finn wage level  may seem surprising.  However, given the earlier results, the positive
relationship  between  wages  and  employment  growth  reflects  the  fact  that  higher
productivity  firms  are able  to award  their workers  higher wages.  This is  consistent
with the concept  of "efficiency  wages",  whereby  as  long as  higher wages  lead to  a
more efficient  use  of labor  they  increase  rather than  decrease  profit.  This  is  also
consistent  with  the  theory  of monopsonistic  competition  in  labor  markets,  which
claims  that the  employer  offering  higher wages  can fill their vacancies  more easily
and employs more workers  (Bhaskar et al.,  2002).  However,  if wages are misaligned
with productivity,  which translates into high  unit labor cost then firm employment  is
negatively  affected.  Thus,  descriptive  data  strongly reinforce  the earlier finding that
productivity  improvements  coupled  with  wage  moderation  are  key  factors  behind
faster employment growth.
Investment  in  fixed  capital  evidently  brings  about job  gains.  Machines  and
equipment  are  not  substituted  for  workers  but  instead  enhance  their  productivity.
Firms  who  do  not  invest  often  lay-off workers  and  close jobs.  In  contrast,  firms
which invest simultaneously  create new jobs,  on average  1.4 job per firm.  This may
seem a  small number, but if aggregated  across  firms it translates into a much bigger
-38-one.  Clearly,  measures  which would facilitate  investment,  such as better  access to
credit, carry a potential to boost employment.
To  conclude,  main factors  contributing  to  firm  employment  growth  include
high productivity and low unit labor costs, high capital intensity and investment,  and
export orientation.  Access to credit does not contribute to job creation, likely because
credit is directed  to ineffective  firms rather than  firms with growth potential.  To the
extent  this  is  the  case,  inefficient  allocation  of  resources  translates  into  less  job
creation  than  otherwise  would  be  possible.  These  findings  have  straightforward
policy implications.  Employment  growth will be  fostered by policies that promote
competitions  and  thereby  force  firms  to  improve  productivity,  policies  which  help
firms to lower  costs  (e.g.  through lower  taxation),  policies  which  improve  access  to
credit, facilitate investment and export.  In short, a key for faster job creation is better
investment climate.
Stagnant labor market: job stability but no hiring
The  stagnant  nature  of  the  Croatian  labor  market  also  manifests  itself  in
limited  hiring.  In  a  low  turnover  labor  market  an  unemployed  person  has  little
chances  of  finding  a job.  Data  on employment tenure  show  another  aspect of poor
job  opportunities  in  Croatia.  A  proportion  of persons  with  short  tenure  is  16w,
reflecting the unwillingness  of employers to hire new workers.  On the other hand, the
proportion of workers  with long job tenure  is very  high, reflecting the  high level  of
employment  protection  in  Croatia.  Poor chances  of finding  work  for  the jobless
coexist with high job security  of those who have  work.  This points to labor market
duality.  There are insiders with stable jobs and outsiders with little chances to break
into the formal labor market.  Table  13 documents this division.
-39-Table 13  Distribution of employment  a)  by job tenure:  Croatia against  selected
countries; percentages
1 and  2 and  5 and  10 and  20  Average  Median
Under 1  under  2  under 5  under 10  under  20  years  tenure  tenure
year  years  years  years  years  (years)  (years)
Croatia (2001)  9.7  5.1  17.2  21.3  20.7  26.0  12.2  8.0
Private  sector  13.0  7.1  21.2  21.7  17.0  20.0  10.8  6.0
Public sector  4.9  2.2  11.8  21.3  26.0  33.8  14.1  12.0
Under privatization  2.1  0.5  6.6  12.4  30.9  47.5  17.3  19.0
1-49  15.3  7.8  23.7  21.9  14.5  16.7  9.2  5.4
50-199  6.7  3.1  13.8  19.9  24.5  31.9  14.3  13.3
200+  4.4  3.0  11.3  18.9  26.2  36.2  15.6  15.7
Other  transition economies
Bulgaria (2001)  14.0  9.5  25.2  20.8  19.8  10.8  8.1  5.5
Private sector  20.6  13.0  32.0  18.5  10.6  5.9  5.6  3.5
Public sector  7.3  5.7  17.6  23.2  30.0  16.2  10.8  8.5
Czech R.  19.2  36.6  12.0  14.8  17.4  9.0  2.0
Lithuania (2001)  15.4  8.9  21.6  25.4  16.8  11.9  8.3  5.0
Poland (1999)  14.5  11.7  19.0  17.7  20.3  16.7  9.6  6.2
Market economies
Denmark  25.1  11.4  16.2  18.2  17.7  11.4,  7.9  4.4
France  15.0  8.0  17.7  17.4  23.3  18.7  10.7  7.7
Germany  16.1  9.4  22.0  17.2  18.4  17.0  9.7  10.7
Spain  35.5  4.9  11.1  14.4  17.7  16.5  8.9  4.6
United Kingdom  19.6  10.7  19.5  23.5  17.3  9.4  7.8  5.0
United States  26.0  8.5  20.0  19.8  16.8  9.0  7.4  4.2
Note: data  for the OECD countries  refer to 1995.
a) Wage and salary workers
Sources:
Croatia: Central  Bureau of Statistics,  Author's calculations.
Bulgaria: LFS June 2001, Bank staff calculations.
Lithuania and Poland:  Rutkowski  (2002)
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The  proportion  of workers  with job  tenure  less  than  one  year  (which  is  a
common indicator of labor market dynamics)  is much lower in Croatia than  in both
transition  and  market  economies.  In  Croatia  new  hires  account  for  less  than  10
percent  of all employees.  In  the  restructuring  transition  economies  this  proportion
varies  from  14  to  19 percent.  But the most striking is the  comparison with dynamic
market economies  characterized  by low hiring and firing costs.  In Denmark  and the
U.S.  new hires account for some  one-fourth of employment.  In  Spain, thanks  to the
liberalization of rules governing  the use of fixed-term  contract,  new hires account for
over one-third  of total  employment.  This  comparison  clearly  shows  the  extremely
-40-low amount of hiring taking place in Croatia, and thus the stagnant nature of its labor
market.  This is consistent  with the large share of new labor market entrants  (largely
youth) among the unemployed and reflects barriers to labor market entry.
These barriers are associated with the high level of protection of jobs held by
insiders and the lack of job mobility.  Over one-fourth of all workers in Croatia have
held their jobs for 20 years or more,  an extremely high proportion unparalleled in any
other country.  For example, in Bulgaria and Lithuania the proportion of workers with
long  employment  tenure  is  11-12  percent.  In  the  U.K  or  U.S.  it  is  less  than  10
percent.
Extremely high job stability is particularly pronounced  in large public (as well
as  privatized)  enterprises  in  Croatia.  For  example,  large  firms  have  less  than  5
percent  of workers  with  short job  tenure  (less  than  12 months)  and  as much  as  36
percent of workers  with long job tenure (20 years or more).  Hiring is more  frequent
and job  mobility  larger  in  small  private  firms,  however  even in this  "new  sector"
hiring is much lower than  in dynamic market  economies.  Apparently  the new sector
in Croatia is not exempt from constraints to job creation and hiring.
To  conclude,  hiring is  extremely  limited  in  Croatia.  Low hiring is  a  mirror
image of low  firing and  considerable job stability  enjoyed by the insiders.  The high
level of protection of the  interests  of those  who  have jobs substantially  rises implicit
labor costs and, consequently,  makes employers reluctant to hire new workers.  Those
who pay the price are the outsiders:  new entrants to the labor market (mainly youth)
and job losers.
IH.  WHY IS  THE LABOR MARKET STAGNANT?
Why  the job  creation  rate  is  low  an hiring  is  limited  in Croatia?  In the
previous  section  strict employment  protection  regulations  was identified  as a likely
cause of the lack of job mobility and labor market stagnation.  This section examines
more  closely  employment  protection  legislation  in Croatia  and its  impact  on  labor
market dynamics.  Furthermore,  it analyzes  other potential constraints to job creation,
such as labor costs, wage flexibility, and skill mismatch.
-41-Stringent employment  protection legislation
Employment  protection  regulation  in  Croatia  is  among  the  strictest  in
Europe.' 8 Laying-off  redundant  workers  is  difficult  and  costly  due  to  both  high
procedural  and monetary costs of dismissals.  This highly rigid nature of the Croatian
labor market  is  reflected  in  a high  value  of a  composite  index  of the  strictness  of
employment protection legislation (EPL) developed by OECD.1 9 Table  14 documents
that  employment  protection  legislation  is  stricter  in  Croatia  than  in  any  transition
economy accessing EU (which tend to have relatively rigid labor market),  and in fact
stricter than in virtually  all EU and  OECD economies.  It is noteworthy  that EPL  in
Croatia is much stricter than  in countries characterized  by low unemployment  flexible
labor  markets,  such  as  Hungary  among  the  transition  economies,  and  Denmark,
Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  and  the U.K.  among  the  mature  market  economies.  For
illustration,  the summary  EPL index amounts to  1.1  in Ireland or to  1.7  in Hungary,
compared with  3.6  in Croatia.  This  indicates  a truly  dramatic  difference  in  terms of
constraints  facing  employers  who need  to  adjust  the  size  and composition  of their
workforce.  Hence,  strict employment protection,  such as in Croatia,  does not prevent
high unemployment  (resulting  from the cumulative  growth  of the number of persons
who cannot enter the labor market).  Conversely  liberal  employment protection  does
not necessarily  lead  to high unemployment,  to the contrary  it tends to be associated
with better  labor market outcomes  (anglo-saxon countries  - U.S. and U.K. - provide
the best example of relatively low level of employment protection associated with low
unemployment).
18  Labor laws and regulations in  Croatia are discussed in  more detail in Fuenzalida (2002).
'9  The index is a weighted average  of 22 indicators of the strictness of employment protection
legislation in  three areas: (1)  regular contracts (with the weight of 5/12, (2)  temporary contracts (5/12),
and (3)  collective dismissals (2/12).  Regular  contract are divided into (a)  procedural inconveniences
(1/3),  (b)  notice and severance pay (1/3),  and (c)  difficulty of dismissal (1/3).  Temporary contracts
include (a)  fixed term contracts (1/2)  and (b) temporary work agency employment (1/2).  The index for
collective dismissals is  directly computed  by averaging four indicators relating to special requirements
and costs associated with collective dismissals.  The higher the value of the summary index, the stricter
the employment protection  legislation.  The methodology  of calculation of the index is  described in
OECD (1999).
-42-Table 14 Employment  Protection Legislation  Strictness for Croatia and Central
and East European EU accession  countries (CEEEUAC)
EPL strictness
Country  Regular  Temporary  Collective  ummaryindex
employment  employment  dismissals
Croatia  2.8  3.9  5.0  3.6
Czech  Republic  2.8  0.5  4.3  2.1
Estonia  3.1  1.4  4.1  2.6
Hungary  2.1  0.6  3.4  1.7
Poland  2.2  1.0  3.9  2.0
Slovak Republic  2.6  1.4  4.4  2.4
Slovenia  3.4  2.4  4.8  3.5
CEEEUAC average  2.7  1.2  4.1  2.4
EU average  2.4  2.1  3.2  2.4
OECD average  2.0  1.7  2.9  2.0
CEEEUAC minimum  2.1  0.5  3.4  1.7
EU minimum  0.8  0.3  2.1  0.9
OECD minimum  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.7
Sources:  OECD  (1999),  World  Bank  estimates  for  Estonia  and  Slovenia,  Biondic  et  al.
(2002) for Croatia.
The overall high  level of EPL in Croatia reflect regulatory  constraints in three
basic areas:  high procedural and monetary costs associated with individual dismissals,
restrictions  on temporary employment,  and finally high costs of collective  dismissals.
In all three  cases regulations  in  Croatia  are  more  stringent  than in vast majority  of
transition economies,  EU and OECD.  However,  collective  dismissals  are by  far the
most  difficult  and  costly  in  Croatia  across  the  whole  OECD.  The  pertinent  index
reaches the maximum value of 5 in Croatia,  compared  with 3.4 in Hungary and 2.1  in
Ireland.  This means that the costs of collective dismissals - which can mean as few
as five workers - can in man cases be prohibitive in Croatia.  Below we present the
most important legal provisions  contributing to high dismissal costs in Croatia.
Individual dismissals are costly  due to the  long advanced  notice  period  and
high severance  pay.  In addition,  expected costs  are  increased  by high probability of
job  readmission  and  generous  monetary  compensation  ordered  by  courts.
Specifically,  advanced  notice  of dismissal  for  workers  with  20  or  more  years  of
service is 6 months in Croatia, compared with  3 months  in Hungary  or Poland and 2
-43-months in Ireland or Slovakia.20 Severance  pay is determined as two weeks of salary
per year  of service,  with  no upper  limit,  which  is  very  generous.  For  example,  a
Croatian  worker with 20 years of service  would be entitled to  10 monthly salaries  in
severance  pay, while his/her  Slovak,  Irish and Hungarian colleagues would get 2, 2.2
and  5  monthly salaries,  respectively.  Imagine  now that a  Croatian workers  is fired
for, say, poor performance.  As proving poor performance  is difficult,  courts - which
traditionally  have  exhibited  a  pro  labor  bias  - tend  to  order job  readmission  and
compensation  amounting to  forgone  earnings  (with no upper limit).  Given lengthy
court procedures,  expected  hiring costs  are high,  effectively discouraging  employers
from laying worker off.
Temporary (fixed-term)  employment  is  way  of circumventing  high  costs  of
terminating  regular employment contracts.  However,  the law  in Croatia  restricts  its
use by requiring  that temporary contracts are  signed  only on exceptional basis when
there is a valid and important reason.21 Furthermore,  the total cumulative duration of
temporary  employment  cannot  exceed  three  years.  While  many  countries  impose
some restrictions  on the use of temporary  employment  contracts,  in Croatia they are
more  strict  than  in  other  countries.  For  example,  in  Hungary  or Estonia  the  total
duration  of  temporary  contracts  can  be  five  years.  Accordingly,  the  incidence  of
temporary  contracts  - 11  percent -- is relatively  low in  Croatia.  For comparison,  in
Spain, where  temporary  contracts  were  introduced  specifically  to improve  flexibility
and increase  hiring,  they account for about one-third of all  contracts (Dolado  et al.,
2002).  However, despite the restrictions, temporary contracts  seem to be increasingly
used  by  Croatian  employers.  After  all,  there  is  a  perception  that  they  are  being
abused, because  reportedly the majority of new hires are offered fixed-term  contracts.
Using  the  recent  Labor  Force  Survey  (2001)  data  we  estimate  the  incidence  of
temporary  employment contracts  among new  hires at 55 percent.  The proportion of
newly  concluded  fixed-term  contracts  is  high,  indicting  weak  enforcement  of the
relevant provision of the Labor Law.  The growing popularity of fixed term contracts
among employers reflects  high dismissal costs in the case of permanent  employment
contracts,  and  is  a  source  of necessary  employment  flexibility  for  employers.  As
20  As documented earlier in the paper, the proportion of workers with long job tenure, for whom
dismissal costs are substantially higher, is very high in Croatia compared with other countries.
21  Valid reasons include seasonal  work, replacement of a temporary absent employee, special
business needs,  etc.
-44-such,  fixed  term  contracts  contribute  to  greater  hiring and  play a positive  function.
The only  efficient way to  increase the uise  of permanent  contracts by employers  is to
significantly lower the firing costs associated with-ihem.
If individual  dismissals  are difficult,  collective dismissals are even more so in
Croatia.  Accordingly  lay-offs  for ecohomic  or technological  reasons are very costly.
One source  of the problem is an overly inclusive  definition of collective redundancy
in  Croatia  whereby  special  regulations  apply from  5 dismissals  over the  period of 6
months  upward.  This  is a much broader definition  that  in the  EU,  where  collective
redundancy  is  defined  as  either  10  or more  workers  laid  off over the period  of  1
month, or 20 or more workers  laid off over the period of 3 months.22
Another  source of the high costs of collective  dismissals are  strict procedural
requirements.  They  include  consultation  with  trade  unions  on  alternatives  to
redundancy,  notification of local Employment Office  and  an obligation  to prepare  a
Social  Plan,  to  mitigate  the  effects  of redundancy.  These  procedural  requirements
involve  an  additional  delay  of 90  days before'a  notice of dismissal  can  be  issued.
This is much longer than in other countries where the additional  delay usually is four
to  six  weeks.  Altogether,  collective  disrmissal  in* Croatia  involve  lengthy  and
cumbersome  procedures,  which translate  into  direct financial  costs of compensating
redundant labor.
What are the implications  of stringent employment protection  regulations  and
high  firing  costs  in  for  labor  market  pe'rformance  in  Croatia?  Basically,  they
contribute to and account  for the observed unfavorable  labor  market  outcomes,  such
as  low  job  creation  and  hiring,  long  duration  of  unemployment  spells,  and  the
concentration of unemployment  among disadvantaged worker groups.23
The  mechanics  of the impact of strict EPL on labor market outcomes  are  as
follows.  All but prohibitive  dismissal costs in Croatia' explain the observed low firing
and job destruction  rates.  At  the  same  time,  they  contribute  to low hiring  and job
creation rates.  This effect works through two channels.  First, stringent labor market
22  European  Council  Directive 98i591EC.  See Fuenzalida  2002 for the comparison  of
employment  protection in Croatia with EU nornms.
23  It has been extensively documrented that the costs of labor market rigidities and poor labor
market performance  are disproportionately borne by vulnerable, worker  groups,  such as youth, women
and older individuals.  See Bertola et al. (2002)  for most recent research on the relationship between
labor market institutions and demographic  employment patterns.
-45-regulations  discourage  firm  entry  (Scarpetta,  2002).  Second,  high  firing  costs
discourage hiring as employers  limit staff recruitment in order to avoid future costs of
employment  adjustment  to changes  in product demand (OECD  1994).  Accordingly,
limited hiring is a mirror image of limited  firing.  By hindering both job destruction
and job  creation  strict  EPL limits job turnover.  As  a result,  both  employment and
unemployment  spells tend  to be  longer.  The  chances  to  escape  unemployment,  are
thus  less  than  in  a  dynamic,  high  turnover  labor  market.  This,  coupled  with  the
discouraged  worker effect,  leads to lower employment-to-population  ratio,  especially
among  disadvantaged  worker groups,  such  as youth, women  and older  workers,  and
thus to the underutilization of labor resources (OECD 1999).
Moreover,  by  inhibiting  job  turnover  and  raising  the  costs  of  enterprise
restructuring,  strict  EPL  in  Croatia  hinders productivity  improvements  and  thereby
lowers the rate of economic  growth.  Finally, strict EPL provides an incentive to firms
to move  to  or remain  in the  informal  sector  in order  to lower explicit  and  implicit
labor costs (Schneider and Enste, 2000).
Economic costs of overly strict EPL, in Croatia are thus enormous.  Ultimately
they  boil  down  to  lower  employment  and  slower economic  growth  and  thereby  to
lower welfare of the population.  This is not a price worth paying for high job security
of insiders, i.e. those workers who have protected jobs in the formal sector.
High labor costs
Wages are high in Croatia, higher than virtually all other transition economies
of Central and Eastem Europe (Table  15).  An average manufacturing worker receives
close to USD 500  in Croatia, which is from 50 to  100 percent higher than in Croatia's
closest competitors  such as the Czech  Republic  (USD  340),  Hungary  (USD  310) or
Slovakia (USD 260) and almost five times as much as in Bulgaria or Romania (USD
110).
-46-Table 15 Gross monthly wages in manufacturing, 2000
Gross  Labor  Gross  GIprcpt
wages  compensation  GNI  per capita  wages  GNI per capita
$  Croatia =  100
Bulgaria.  109  1520  22  33
Croatia  494  577.9  4620  100  100
Czech  Republic  341  503.5  5250  69  114
Estonia  281  373.3  3580  57  77
Greece  1432  ..  11960  290  259
Hungary  312  449.7  4710  63  102
Ireland  1804  ..  22660  365  490
Latvia  225  ..  2920  46  63
Lithuania  247  ..  2930  50  63
Poland  457  605.3  4190  92  91
Portugal  679  ..  11120  138  241
Romania  112  ..  1670  23  36
Slovakia  255  382.2  3700  52  80
Slovenia  793  1093.9  10050  160  218
Spain  1461  ..  15080  296  326
= Not available
a) Gross wage plus payroll taxes.
Sources:
Wages:  Yearbook of Labor Statistics 2001,  ILO
Gross  National Income: World Bank Atlas, 2002
Exchange  rate: World Development  Indicators, The World Bank, 2002.
Do  these wage  differentials  reflect productivity  differentials?  The answer is
no.  Relatively high wages in Croatia are not justified by proportionately higher labor
productivity.  Using GNI per capita  as a proxy for labor productivity,  it turns out that
wage  differentials  between  Croatia  and  other  transition  economies  are  larger  than
productivity  differentials.2 4 Croatia does  not  enjoy a productivity  advantage  which
would  warrant  the  existing  level  of wages.  In other  words,  productivity  adjusted
wages  are  high  in  Croatia  compared  with  other  countries.  For  example,
manufacturing  wages  in Slovenia  are about 60 percent  higher than Croatia, however
-productivity is over twice as high,  which implies that despite higher wages, unit labor
24  Clearly, GNI per capita is a very rough proxy for manufacturing productivity (output per
worker), and accordingly  the results  presented are gross approximation.  Nonetheless,  given cross-
country correlation between GNI per capita and productivity, the scope for large errors regarding the
ranking of countries with respect unit labor costs seems limited.
-47-costs  are  lower  in  Slovenia.  Similarly,  while  labor productivity  in Hungary  is at a
similar level as in Croatia, Hungarian wages are on average by one-third lower.
Labor costs  comprise not only gross worker  wage but also payroll taxes paid
by the employer.  The  payroll tax rate, at around  17 percent,  is lower in Croatia than
in other transition economies  of CEE and in fact lower than in most EU countries.  By
way of comparison,  the payroll  tax  rate  in EU  accession  countries  ranges  from  33
percent  in Estonia to  50 percent in the Slovak Republic.  The average payroll tax rate
in the EU is 23.5 percent (Ribaud et al., 2002).  The  low payroll tax rate in Croatia is
a positive  factor,  as high payroll taxes negatively  affect  labor demand.  Nonetheless,
the relatively low payroll tax rate in Croatia does not  offset the relatively high gross
wages.  Labor  costs  in  Croatia  are  still  higher  than  in most  of its  East European
competitors.  For  example,  labor  costs  in  Croatia's  manufacturing  are  about  15
percent higher than in the Czech Republic,  30 percent higher than in Hungary and 50
percent higher than in Slovakia.
As  a  digression,  it  should  be  noted  that  he  sole  focus  on  payroll  taxes  is
misguided  as  contributions  can  be  shifted  from  employers  to  employees  without
affecting  the  level of labor  costs.  That  is exactly  the case in Croatia:  while  social
security  contributions  paid by paid  by  employers  are  relatively  low,  those paid  by
employees  are relatively  high, accounting  for the high gross wages.  What matters  is
thus  the  total  tax  wedge - the  wedge  between  labor  costs  to  the  employer  and  the
corresponding net take-home  pay  of the employee.  Currently the tax wedge accounts
for 41.1% of total labor costs in Croatia (Table  16),  which is still relatively low both
by standards of EU and other transition economies of CEE.  For example, in CEE the
tax wedge ranged  (in 2000) from 44.4 percent in the Slovak Republic  to 45.3 percent
in Poland, to 56.3 percent in Hungary (OECD  2001).  In the EU the tax wedge ranges
from  39.4  percent  in  the  U.K.  to  67  percent  in  Belgium,  with  the  average
(unweighted)  at 52.7 percent. 
25 It should be stressed that the relatively low tax wedge
is  a results of a conscientious  effort of the govemment of Croatia, who  recognizing
the  importance  of low  labor  costs  for  Croatia's  competitiveness  and  employment,
reduced the tax wedge by a considerable  7 percentage points in the second half of he
1990s.
25  The tax wedge is calculated for a single individual at the income  level of the average
production  worker.Table 16 The structure of labor costs
(gross wage = 100)
Labor cost components  1995  2000  2002
1  Employee gross wage  100  100  100
2  Employer contributions  (payroll taxes) a)  21.78  16.98  17.92
2.1  health insurance  7  7  7
2.2  professional disease  0  0  0.47
2.3  pension insurance  12.75  8.75  8.75
2.4  unemployment  insurance  0.85  0.85  1.7
2.5  water contribution  0.8  0  0
2.6  chamber of commerce  contribution  0.38  0.38  0
3  Employee taxes and contributions a)  37.00  31.69  30.55
3.1  health insurance  7.0  9.0  9.0
3.2  pension insurance  12.75  10.75  10.75
3.3  child allowance contribution  2.2  0  0
3.4  unemployment insurance  0.85  0.85  0
3.5  personal income tax (effective)  14.2  11.1  10.8
4  Net (take-home) wage (1)  - (3)  63.00  68.31  69.45
5  Laborcosts(1)+(2)  121.78  116.98  117.92
6  Tax wedge b) [(5)-(4)]/(5)* 100  48.27  41.60  41.10
a) as a percentage of employee gross wage
b) as a percentage of labor cost
Source: Ministry of Finance; Bank staff calculations.
All in all,  unit labor  costs in Croatia  are  high, higher  than in  Croatia's main
competitors.26 This has an important negative  effect on labor demand.  First, there  is
a direct effect whereby higher labor costs imply lower labor demand.  Second, there  is
an  indirect effect  whereby higher unit labor costs implies  lower profit margin which
discourages  investment by lowering resources  available  for investment  and expected
returns on investment.  Lower investment, in turn translates into less jobs creation and
lower employment.
Why are  labor costs high in Croatia?  Given that the tax wedge is moderate,  it
is  workers  net pay that  is the primary reason of high unit labor costs.  One possible
factor  behind  relatively  high  wages  is  wage  pressure  exerted  by  insiders,  that  is
workers  with  secure  jobs  who  therefore  have  a  strong  bargaining  position.  In
addition,  the industry  level bargaining,  which prevails  in Croatia,  especially in large
26  Unit labor costs in Croatia  is even higher if one uses the hourly wage rate instead  of average
wage per worker.  This is due to the relatively short working hours in Croatia (effectively  37.5 hours
per week), which  is less than  in most other countries in the region,  where the working hours are 40 per
week.
-49-firms,  and  which  is  known  to  generate  wage  pressure,  has  likely  contributed  to
increase  in  labor  costs  (Calmfors  and Driffil,  1988).27  Strong  real  wage  growth,
unparalleled  in  other transition economies,  which has occurred  in Croatia  since mid
1990s,  is consistent with both hypothesis.  If so, then high unit labor costs in Croatia
result  from  the  interaction  between  the  strict  EPL  (which  gives  rise  to  insiders'
bargaining power) and wage bargaining  institutions,  specifically the predominance  of
industry level bargaining.
To  summarize, unit labor costs are  high in Croatia, higher than in most of its
close competitors,  reflecting  wages not aligned with productivity.  This has a negative
impact on hiring and employment level.  In addition to limiting current labor demand,
high unit  labor  costs  also  discourage  investment,  thus  limiting  future  employment.
The  likely  cause  of  high  labor  costs  in  Croatia  are  strong  bargaining  position  of
insiders,  stemming  from  strict employment  protection,  coupled  with  industry  level
bargaining,  which  generates  wage  pressures.  Given  that  the tax wedge  is relatively
low, the only way to lower unit labor costs  (without lowering real wages)  is  through
productivity improvements,  which  necessitate  intensive enterprise  restructuring.  It is
essential  to  reform  wage  bargaining  institutions  so  that  these  gains  are  not  fully
consumed by the wage  growth.
Compressed  wage structure
The wage structure is more compressed in Croatia than in most other transition
economies.  The  Gini  coefficient  - a  summary  measure  of  income  inequality  -
amounts  to 0.274 in Croatia,  while in other transition economies of Central  Europe it
is  around  0.300  or  higher  (Rutkowski  2001).  Earnings  dispersion  is  thus  rather
modest  in  Croatia.  However,  at  closer  inspection  it  turns  out  that  the  earnings
structure  in  Croatia  exhibits  some  peculiar  features.  The  wage  distribution  is
compressed at the upper tail, while having a relatively  long and heavy lower tail.  This
is  in  contrast  to  other  transition  economies,  where  wage  distribution  has  widened
mainly at the upper end,  meaning that  in the  course of transition  high earnings have
become more prevalent.  In Croatia still the incidence of high pay seems to be limited.
27  The structure of wage bargaining and its impact  on wage pressure is a complex issue which
requires further investigation.  Here we just point to a potential source of wage pressures observed  in
Croatia.
-50-At the  same time the incidence  of low pay is quite high,  comparable  to that in higher
inequality transition economies, such as Hungary.28
Specifically, the bottom decile worker earns 54 percent of the median earnings
which  indicates  a  fair  amount of wage  flexibility  at  the  lower  end  of the  eamings
distribution (Table  17).  For comparison,  in Slovenia the bottom  decile  worker earns
some  60  percent  of the  median,  which  is  characteristic  of a  more  egalitarian  wage
structure.  Simultaneously,  over 20 percent of all wage  and salary  earners  in Croatia
eam less than two-thirds of the median, which means that the incidence of low pay is
quite  high.29 For  instance  in the  EU  countries,  where  wage  inequality tends  to  be
limited, the incidence of low pay rarely exceeds  15 percent.
Table 17 Summary of earnings a) distribution, 2001
Mean  Bottom  Median  Top  P10  P90  Decile  Gini  coeff.
decile  decile  PO  P0  ratio
Kuna  %
All workers (CBS)  3397  1626  3008  5270  54.0  175.2  3.2  0.274
All workers (FINA) b)3448  1850  3454  4943  53.6  143.1  2.7  0.206
Sector
Public sector  3838  2824  3886  4661  72.7  119.9  1.7  0.117
Private sector  3124  1685  2805  5103  60.1  182.0  3.0  0.240
Note:
P1O denotes the eamings of the bottom decile  relative to the median, expressed  as a percentage.
The decile ratio is the ratio  of the top decile to the bottom decile,  i.e.  P90/P10.
a) Gross earnings.
b) Legal persons only; February 2002
Source:  FINA and
Struktura zaposlenih  prema visni prosjecne  isplacene neto place  i po djelatnostima  u ozujku 2001,  CBS.
Author's calculations.
At the  other  extreme,  the  top  decile  worker earns  75  percent  more  than  the
median worker.  This  represents  a lower premium  for high  skills than in most other
28  In this sub-section the terms high and low pay have a relative rather than absolute  meaning,
i.e. refer to wage inequality rather than the level.  This is in contrast to the preceding sub-section, where
the focus was on the absolute level of wages.  To illustrate the difference between  these two concepts
(of absolute  and relative wages), the wages are high in Croatia relative to other transition  economies;  at
the same time there is a relatively large number of workers  who are low paid  compared with the
median worker, and a relatively small  number of workers who are highly paid compared with the
median worker.
29  This figure can be inflated,  however,  by employers  underreporting  wages in order to lower  the
payment of social security contributions.
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the median worker.  Simultaneously,  the  incidence  of high pay is  limited.  Only  17
percent  of workers  earn more than  1.5  times the median  in Croatia,  compared with
over 20  percent  in  countries  such  as Hungary,  Poland  or  Slovenia.  This  is  not  a
dramatic  difference,  nonetheless  it is  significant  and indicative of some  rigidities in
the wage  setting process in Croatia (see below).  Highly paid jobs are  still to come in
Croatia.
As in all other transition economies,  wage inequalities are much higher in the
private than in the public sector.  For example, the decile ratio - the ratio of top decile
to bottom decile  earnings - is less than two in the public sector and about three in the
private  sector,  which  points  to  substantially  different wage  setting  practices  in both
30 sectors.  In the public  sector wages are still set in a very  egalitarian way, which is
not the case in the private  sector, where wages better reflect productivity differentials
among workers.
It seems that the primary source  of the limited wage  dispersion  in Croatia is
the  still  large  employment  share  of publicly  owned  and  privatized  firms  and  the
relatively low share of de novo private firms.  In the public  sector wages of different
categories  of workers  are determined  according to a standard wage grid, i.e.  a system
of coefficients  meant to reflect  skill requirements  associated with different jobs.  The
least  skilled jobs  are  assigned  the coefficient  of one while the most skilled jobs are
assigned  the coefficient  in the five to  six range,  depending  on the  firm or industry
level collective  agreement.  Such a system of wage determination,  supported by trade
unions, is an obvious  source of wage compression, as it produces both the wage floor
and the ceiling.
The wage ceiling  is determined  according  to  a perception  of a fair degree  of
wage  dispersion.  As to the  wage  floor,  this role  is usually played by the minimum
wage.  However,  there is no statutory minimum wage in Croatia.  Instead this role  is
played  by  the  minimum  base  for  social  security  contribution  (which  presently
accounts for about 50 percent of the average  wage).  This notional minimum wage  is
as a rule used in collective agreements as the floor for the wage  structure, although in
30  The data on the pubic/private  sector wage structure come from  a different source than data on
overall wage distribution and are not comparable.
-52-some industries, where trade unions  bargaining position is stronger, this floor is set at
a somewhat higher level.
What are the ramifications  of the existing wage structure?  The relatively high
incidence  of  low-paid  jobs  implies  two  things.  First,  it  contributes  to  income
inequalities.  On the  other hand,  however,  it provides  employment  opportunities  for
low skilled and inexperienced  workers.  To the extent this is the case, wage  inequality
alleviates  inequality  that  is  more  socially  harmful,  namely  that  in  access  to  work.
Thus, given the high level of unemployment  in Croatia,  wage flexibility  at the  lower
end  of the  distribution should  be viewed  as  a  positive  factor,  on balance  enhancing
social welfare.
Second,  the relatively  low incidence of top paying jobs may imply relatively
low  premium for high and  specialized  skills  and may  thus  discourage  investment  in
such  skills.  A  question  which  requires  further  investigation  is  whether  there  is  a
sufficient  supply  of high  skills  in  Croatia and  whether  firms  are  able  to recruit  and
retain highly skilled workers.  This problem  is most probably concentrated  in public
and privatized firms.
To  summarize,  the  wage  structure  in Croatia is  somewhat more  compressed
than in  other transition economies.  This  reflects  a  still  relatively large  share of the
public  sector,  where  wage  setting  is  more  egalitarian,  mainly  due  to  the -active
involvement of trade unions.  Unlike other transition economies, the wage structure in
Croatia  is  decompressed  at the  lower  tail  of the  distribution  and  compressed  at the
upper tail.  The  decompressed  lower end of the wage  distribution  is likely to reflect
the  lack of statutory minimum  wage,  whereas  the compressed  upper end is likely to
reflect trade unions' perception of fair wage differentials.
Wage  flexibility at the lower end of the distribution translates into a relatively
high incidence of low-paid jobs.  While this contributes to income inequalities,  it also
provides  job  opportunities  for  low  productivity  workers  and  thus  alleviates  the
unemployment  problem.  The  compressed  earnings distribution at the upper end may
limit the  supply of highly specialized  and  rare skills.  This  is an  empirical  question
which merits  further investigation.
All in all, the wage  structure does not seem to be a  factor contributing to poor
labor market performance  in Croatia.
-53-Skill and spatial mismatches?
Unemployment  in transition  economies  is  often  of frictional  and  structural
nature, reflecting accelerated restructuring  and spatial and skill mismatches occurring
in its  course.  These  mismatches  emerge  because  new jobs  that are  being  created
differ in salient characteristics - such as the skill content and location -- from the old
jobs that are  being eliminated.  Accordingly,  a faster pace of enterprise restructuring
can  be  expected  to lead  to  more  pronounced  labor  market  mismatches  and hence
higher unemployment.
Given  the  slow pace  of enterprise  restructuring  in Croatia  and  thus  limited
inflows into unemployment  one can conjecture that frictional  unemployment does not
play a significant  role.  In order to gauge the extent of structural  unemployment  one
needs to compare the skill and location structure of available jobs (vacancies) with the
structure of unemployment.  For example, the more the skills required by employers
differ  from  the  skills  possessed  by  the  unemployed,  the  larger  is  structural
unemployment.  Unfortunately,  there is no good measure  of the skill content.  As a
rough  proxy  one  can  use  educational  attainment,  however  in this  case  important
aspects  - such  as occupational,  computer,  communication,  language,  or managerial
skills - are left out from the analysis.
With  this  caveat  in  mind,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  educational
structure  of  existing  jobs  does  not  differ  significantly  from  the  structure  of
unemployment  in  Croatia  (Table  18).  This  is  in  contrast  to  most  transition
economies,  where  there  is  a visible  discrepancy  between  those  two  structures:  the
proportion  of low  skilled  jobs  is  much  lower  than  the  proportion  of low  skilled
unemployed.  Accordingly,  an index  of skill  mismatch  is  lower  in Croatia  than in
other transition economies.  As noted, this is a far from perfect measure of the extent
of the  skill mismatch,  but nonetheless it suggests that inadequate  formal educational
attainment  of the  unemployed  is not a primary  cause of unemployment  in  Croatia.
This  positive  finding  notwithstanding,  it is  likely  that  some  of the  unemployed,
especially the long-term unemployed whose skills tend to erode, lack important skills
sought after by the employers, which limits their chances to find a job.
-54-Table  18  The  structure  of  employment  and  unemployment  by  educational
attainment, 2001
Education  Share in  Share in  "Excess Educatbon  employment unemployment  supply"
Less than primary  5.6  3.3  -2.3
Primary  17.6  15.8  -1.8
Vocational  school a)  22.4  30.2  7.8
Secondary technical b)  32.9  35.5  2.6
Secondary general  3.5  4.9  1.4
College  6.5  4  -2.5
University  11.5  6.3  -5.2
a)  1 to 3 year courses
b) 4 year courses
Source:  Labor Force Survey, CBS;  Author's calculations.
As to the spatial mismatch,  it is difficult to assess it degree due to the lack of
relevant  data.31  Other  studies  documented  relatively  strong  regional  variation  of
unemployment  in  Croatia,  which may point to regional  mismatches  (Bisogno  2000).
Still, given  relatively little  variation  in the job creation and job  destruction  rates by
region, these regional differences  in labor market conditions are more likely to be of a
historic  nature rather than  recent developments resulting  from the differential  rate  of
enterprise restructuring during the transition.
We can  tentatively  conclude  that educational  and spatial  mismatches  arising
from  industrial  restructuring  are  not  major  factors  behind  high  unemployment  in
Croatia.  Indirect  evidence  supporting  this  claim  comes  from  slow  pace  of job
reallocation  in  Croatia.  As  few jobs  are being  destroyed  and  created,  there  is not
much  scope  for mismatch between  the old and new jobs.  A more  direct evidence
comes  from  the  comparison  of  the  educational  structure  of  employment  and
unemployment.  Both  are  similar  and  there  is  no  - common  in other  countries  -
disproportion  between the fractions of low skilled jobs and low skilled unemployed.
Nonetheless,  there  are reasons  to believe  that long  term  unemployment  - which is
substantial in Croatia - is associated with inadequate skills.
3  1  The Central Bureau of Statistics does not publish data on unemployment by region.
-55-IV.  CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS:  BARRIERS TO JOB CREATION  AND
HOW TO REMOVE THEM
This paper shows that a slow pdce of  job creation is at the root of poor labor
market  performance  in  Croatia.  This  slow  pace  of job  creation  is  caused  by  (a)
barriers  to  entry by new firms,  and  (b) barriers  to  expansion by existing  firms. The
paper  focuses  on, the  latter  issue  and' finds  that the  strict  employment  protection
legislation  in Croatia  is a key  constraint  on job creation  and hiring.  In addition, and
not independently, job creation is slowed  down by high unit labor costs.  These high
unit labor costs are  a result of the wage, pressure  exerted by insiders, that is workers
with protected  and secure jobs employed in a still large old sector, consisting of large
state owned or privatized  enterprises.  In addition  the paper  examines other possible
causes  of slow  job  creation  and  high  unemployment,  such  as  the  unemployment
benefit system,  the  wage  structure,  enterprise  restructuring  and  associated  skill  and
spatial  mismatches.  These factors  seem  to play  a  negligible  or a  secondary  role.
Thus,  reforms  of the  employment  protection  legislation  and  the  wage  bargaining
system are key for improving labor market performance in Croatia.
The  overarching  objective  of .such  reforms  is  to  enhance  labor  market
flexibility through deregulation and decentralization  of industrial relations  in Croatia.
The following specific measures should help to achieve this objective.32
*  Lowering  barriers  to.  entry  by  small  private  firms  and  improving
business environment for SMEs;
*  Liberalizing  the  employment  protection  legislation  through  amending
the Labor Code.  Specifically:
o  Lowering  costs  of  individual  dismissals  by  shortening  the
notice period and lowering the statutory severance pay;
o  Relaxing  restrictions  on  the  use  of fixed-term  and  temporary
contracts;
o  Revising the definition of collective dismissals so that it applies
to at least 20 workers  (released within 90 days), and exempting
32  The reformns recommended here are consistent with those agreed upon between the
Government of Croatia and the World Bank under the Structural  Adjustment Loan (SAL).
-56-small employers  from  special  provisions  regarding  group  lay-
offs;
*  Decentralizing  industrial  relations,  in  particular  moving  away  from
industry level bargaining toward firm level bargaining.
In addition, aggressively  applying job availability  and search tests would help
to discriminate  between those  unemployed  who  are registered in order to find a job
and those who  are registered  to have access to benefits.  This in turn would allow the
relevant agencies to have a clearer picture of actual unemployment and its changes.
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-59-ANNEX  1
Description of the Survey of Employment and Wages  (RAD-1)
The  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  (CBS)  carries  out  a  monthly  survey  of
employment  and wages  referred  to as RAD-1.  This survey  was  a primary  source  for
the analysis of job creation and job destruction.  To track changes in employment (job
gains/loses)  matched  records  for  January  2000  and  January  2001  were  used.  The
main characteristics  of the survey are as follows.
Sample  design  and firm coverage
The  survey  uses  a  targeted  sample  of establishments,  constructed  so  as  to
cover 70 percent of employment within a 2-digit NACE industrial activity.  Due to the
sample  design,  small  firms  are  underrepresented  in  the sample.  Data  is grouped  by
industrial  activity rather than by firm.  This means  that if a firm carries  out two, say,
different  NACE  activities  it  is treated  as two different  establishments.  The sample
was drawn from the Register of Business Entities and from the database  administered
by  the  Office  for  Payment  Transactions  (FINA).  All  surveyed  firms  are  legal
persons, i.e.  firms which  are natural  persons  are  not included.  The  matched  2000-
2001  sample  includes  only continuing  firms only,  i.e.  does not include  firms  which
did  not  report  employment  either  in  2000  or  in  2001.  Accordingly,  there  is  no
information in the sample on firm entry and exit.  The matched 2000 and 2001  sample
comprised of 6316 firms.
Worker coverage
All employees  within the establishment, regardless of their employment  status
(including part-time workers, temporary workers, etc.).
Definition  of employment
Employment = total employment in the establishment as of January.
Data cleaning
In  a  few  cases  matched  employment  records  showed  implausibly  large
increases  or  decreases  in  firm  employment  over  a  year.  Such  large  employment
changes  are likely to reflect  either mergers,  or splits,  or can be  spurious,  i.e.,  reflect
errors in data entry.  Given that such outliers have a large weight and bias the data  on
job creation and destruction,  they  were  removed  from the  data  set.  An observation
was treated  as  an outlier if the employment  change  was large  in both absolute  and
relative terms.  A large  absolute change was defined as that exceeding three standard
deviations.  A  large  relative  change  was  defined  as  one  exceeding  33%
increase/decrease  in the  employment level  over a year.  As a result of applying the
cleaning procedure 33 observations were removed from the data set.
Basic statistics referring  to the original  data set and the cleaned data set (used
for analysis) are shown in Table Al
-60-Table Al  Sample structure by size, ownership and sector
Firm category  Number of firms
A.  Original data set
All firms  6316  100
Size
-5  592  9.4
6 -10  575  9.1
11  - 50  2569  40.7
51  -250  2103  33.3
251+  477  7.55
Ownership
Public - institutions  2226  35.2
Public - firms  1042  16.5
Private  1911  30.3
Mixed  1137  18
Sector
Agriculture  270  4.3
Business  3755  59.5
Non-business  2291  36.27
B.  Cleaned data set.
All firms  6283  100
Size
-5  592  9.4
6 -10  575  9.2
11  - 50  2568  40.9
51  - 250  2099  33.4
251+  449  . 7.2
Ownership
Public - institutions  2225  35.4
Public - firms  1037  16.5
Private  1898  30.2
Mixed  1123  17.9
Sector
Agriculture  270  4.3
Business  3723  59.26
Non-business  2290  36.45
Source:  Central Bureau of Statistics; Author's  calculations.
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Description of the FINA Enterprise Survey
The  Financial  Agency  (known as FINA)  carries out a yearly  survey of all registered
enterprises  (there are  about 59 thousand active enterprises  as of 2001).  In principle,
reporting  is obligatory.  The survey collects  data on firm financial  indicators and on
employment.  For some  variables  (e.g.  fixed assets,  employment)  data is collected  for
both  the  current  and  the  previous  period.  For  the  purpose  of the  analysis  of
deterninants  of  employment  a  random  sample  of  12  thousand  firms  was  drawn,
constructed  so  as  to  ensure  proportional  representation  of firms  by ownership  and
region. Data refer to 2001.  The main characteri$tics  of the  survey are as follows.
Firm coverage
The survey is a census of all firms registered at the Register of Business Entities. (The
register  does  not cover the  financial  intermediation  sector,  i.e.  banks,  insurance  and
other financial institutions).
Worker coverage
All employees  within the firm,  regardless of their employment  status (including part-
time  workers,  temporary  workers,  etc.).  Also  self-employed  workers  registered  as
profit oriented units.
Definition of employment
Employment = average firm employment  during the year.
Data cleaning
In order to  remove  implausible  observations  the  same  data  cleaning procedure  was
applied  as  the  one  described  in  Annex  1.  As  a  result  of applying  the  cleaning
procedure  44  observations  were  removed  from  the  data  set.  In  addition,  for 2380
firms employment  data for either 2000  or 2001  were  missing and these observations
were thus dropped.
Basic  statistics  referring  to  the  original  data  set and  the  cleaned  data  set  (used  for
analysis)  are shown in Table A2.
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Firm  category  Number of firms
A.  Original data set  12000  100.0
All firms
Size
Missing  1612  13.4
1  3221  26.8
2 - 5  4258  35.5
6-10  1263  10.5
11-50  1217  10.1
51  - 250  340  2.8
251 +  89  0.7
Ownership
Public  144  1.2
Private  11532  96.1
Cooperative  72  0.6
Mixed  252  2.1
Sector
Agriculture  296  2.5
Business  11234  93.6
Non-business  470  3.9
B. Cleaned  data  set
All firms  9576  100.0
Size
1  2884  29.7
2 - 5  3966  41.4
6 -10  1209  12.6
11-50  1171  12.2
51 - 250  304  3.2
251+  82  0.9
Ownership
Public  127  1.3
Private  9184  95.9
Cooperative  59  0.6
Mixed  206  2.2
Sector
Agriculture  233  2.4
Business  8980  93.8
Non-business  363  3.8
Source: FINA;  Authors calculations.
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